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ABSTRACT 
David Fuente: Essays on Water and Sanitation Service Deliver in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Under the direction of Dale Whittington) 
 
 
 Tariffs (i.e., user fees) will play a critical role in financing the Sustainable Development 
Goals’ aspiration to ensure universal access to water and sanitation services by 2030. This 
dissertation is comprised of three essays that examine the pricing of water and sanitation services 
in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing specifically on the case of Nairobi, Kenya. The first essay 
examines the extent to which the increasing block tariff (IBT) implemented in Nairobi 
effectively targets subsidies to low-income households, one of the primary objectives of the IBT 
implemented by Nairobi City Water and Sewer Company (NCWSC) and the majority of utilities 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I find that high-income residential and 
nonresidential customers receive a disproportionate share of subsidies and that subsidy targeting 
is poor even among households with a private metered connection.  
Subsidy incidence is, however, only one of several criteria that policy makers consider 
when designing tariffs. The second essay provides a systemic review of the literature on pricing 
water and sanitation services, identifying the ways in which the literature might inform tariff 
design and areas for future research. I find that the literature is diverse, fragmented, and focused 
primarily on industrialized countries. The majority of studies in the literature also examine two 
or fewer criteria, limiting the extent to which the literature characterizes the actual tradeoffs 
policy makers face when designing tariffs. 
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The third essay develops a framework for simulating the performance of water and 
sanitation tariffs. I apply this framework to the case of Nairobi to examine the performance of 
five alternative tariff structures relative to the IBT implemented by NCWSC. I find that tariff 
alternatives with a uniform volumetric price perform equally well or better than IBT tariff 
alternatives at three levels of cost recovery. These findings add to a growing body of evidence 
that challenges commonly held perceptions about IBTs. These findings also underscore the 
benefits of getting utilities on path to full cost recovery, an essential component of financing the 
global aspiration to ensure universal access to high quality water and sanitation services.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In September 2015, global leaders met at the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Summit to adopt the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), an ambitious set of goals aimed at 
ending poverty, improving human health and well-being, and addressing climate change. The 
SDG for water and sanitation (Goals 6.1 and 6.2) seek to ensure access to safe and affordable 
water and sanitation services for all by 2030. This represents a major shift in global ambition 
both with respect to the scope of the goals – universal access – as well as the target level of 
service. The SDGs defines “safe” services as service that is safely managed, available on 
premise, when needed. The World Bank estimates that it will cost approximately 100 billion 
USD per year between now and 2030 to meet the SDGs for water and sanitation (Hutton and 
Varughese 2016). This estimate does not include the cost of maintaining, repairing, or replacing 
countries’ existing water and sanitation infrastructure, or the cost of investing in infrastructure 
that is resilience to climate change.  
While many low and middle income countries face the challenge of investing in their first 
generation of water and sanitation infrastructure, the water and sanitation infrastructure in many 
industrialized countries is reaching, or has reached, the end of its useful life and is in many cases 
failing. In the United States, the American Society of Civil Engineering have given the nation’s 
water and sanitation infrastructure a D+ rating, indicating that the infrastructure is in poor 
condition. According to the American Water Works Association and American Society for Civil
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 Engineers, it will cost approximately one trillion dollars to replace the United States’ water 
infrastructure network and 300 billion dollars to meet the United States’ wastewater and storm 
water capital requirements (ASCE 2013). These estimates also do not include the cost of 
investing in climate-resilient water and sanitation infrastructure.  
Financing the next generation of water and sanitation infrastructure in both developing 
and industrialized countries will require the mobilization of substantial resources. There are three 
general ways in which governments can finance this infrastructure transition: taxes, tariffs (i.e., 
user fees), and transfers (e.g., from international donors). Given the magnitude of the 
infrastructure challenge, governments will need to deploy each of these sources of finance to 
ensure their citizens have access to high quality water and sanitation services. To date, tariffs 
have largely been under-utilized by governments and service providers as source of domestic 
finance for water and sanitation service delivery, particularly in low and middle-income 
countries. The International Monetary Fund estimated that in 2012 nearly 500 billion USD in 
subsidies were delivered through water and sanitation tariffs as a result of prices that were 
insufficient to cover the full cost of services (Kochar et al. 2015). This may seem 
counterintuitive because tariffs – and a stable revenue stream – directly affect utilities’ ability to 
attract finance from domestic and international capital markets.   
This dissertation is comprised of three essays that examine water and sanitation service 
delivery in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing specifically on the pricing of water and sanitation 
services in one of the region’s largest cities, Nairobi, Kenya. Sub-Saharan Africa was one of only 
two regions1 not to meet the Millennium Development Goal of halving the population without 
                                                           
1 The other region is Oceania, which includes many small nations in the Pacific Islands. 
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access to improved water and sanitation facilities by 2015 (UNICEF and WHO 2015). It is also 
the region where the investment needed to meet the SDG aspiration of ensuring universal access 
to safely managed water and sanitation services is greatest.   
The first and third essays in the dissertation examine issues related to the pricing of 
municipal water and sanitation services using the case of Nairobi, Kenya, a city widely regarded 
as the economic hub of East Africa.  In particular, these essays examine the performance of the 
existing increasing block tariff (IBT) implemented by the Nairobi City Water and Sewer 
Company (NCWSC) and a suite of potential alternative tariffs relative to several indicators of 
tariff performance. The IBT is among the most widely used tariffs by water utilities, particularly 
in developing countries. According to a recent survey of water utilities across the globe, 53% 
percent of utilities in the sample implement an IBT, with 74% percent of utilities in developing 
countries doing so (GWI 2013).  
In a traditional IBT, the marginal price for water use increases from one usage block to 
the next and customers are charged the marginal price for water use in each block accordingly. 
The popularity of the IBT reflects two widely held perceptions about its potential merits. First, 
policy makers believe a low marginal price in the lowest usage block of an IBT, often referred to 
as a “lifeline block”, will ensure that low-income households have access to a certain quantity of 
water at a price deemed affordable. Second, they believe that higher prices in the upper block(s) 
of the IBT can both prevent wasteful or extravagant water use and provide an opportunity to 
improve cost recovery from households who use more water. 
The first essay of the dissertation combines data on households’ socioeconomic status 
and metered water use to examine the distributional incidence of subsidies delivered through the 
IBT in Nairobi. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I find that high-income residential and non-
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residential customers receive a disproportionate share of subsidies and that subsidy targeting is 
poor even among households with a private metered connection. I also find that stated 
expenditure on water, a commonly used means of estimating water use, is a poor proxy for 
metered use and that previous studies on subsidy incidence underestimate the magnitude of the 
subsidy delivered through water tariffs. These findings have implications for both the design and 
evaluation of water tariffs in developing countries. 
Subsidy targeting is, however, only one of several criteria that policy makers might 
consider when designing tariffs for water and sanitation services. Recognizing this, the second 
essay of the dissertation provides a systemic review of the literature pricing water and sanitation 
services, highlighting ways in which insights from the literature might inform water and 
sanitation service pricing and identifying areas for future research. I find that the empirical 
literature on pricing municipal water and sanitation services is diverse and fragmented. Studies 
identified through this systematic review are published in a wide range of journals and vary 
considerably with respect to their core aims, methods, number of tariffs examined, and the 
indicators of tariff performance considered. However, the majority of studies examine two or 
fewer objectives, limiting the extent to which the literature characterizes the tradeoffs policy 
makers often face when setting tariffs for municipal water and sanitation services. I also find that 
the majority of studies in the literature focus on water pricing in industrialized countries, 
highlighting an opportunity for research on water pricing in low and middle-income countries. 
Informed by the second essay, the third essay develops a framework for simulating the 
performance of water and sanitation tariffs with respect to several policy-relevant criteria. I then 
apply this framework to the case of Nairobi. In particular, I examine the performance of five 
alternative tariff structures relative the current tariff implemented by Nairobi City Water and 
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Sewer Company (NCWSC) at three different levels of cost recovery. I then evaluate the 
performance of alternative tariffs relative to several indicators of tariff performance, including: 
the overall quantity of water sold (i.e., conservation), the magnitude of the total subsidy 
delivered through the tariff, subsidy incidence, and overall changes in social welfare. I also 
examine how the tariff alternatives perform under uncertainty about consumer behavior. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, I find that tariff alternatives with a uniform volumetric price 
perform equally well or better than IBT tariff alternatives at the three levels of cost recovery we 
examine.  This includes both a two-part tariff long promoted by economists (i.e., uniform price 
with rebate) as well as a simple tariff with a uniform volumetric price. These findings are robust 
to assumptions about whether customers respond to average or marginal price. Overall, these 
findings add to a growing body of evidence that challenges commonly held perceptions about 
IBTs and suggest that the attention policy makers and tariff consultants pay to selecting the size 
of the lifeline block and number of blocks in an IBT is misdirected. These findings also 
underscore the benefits of getting utilities on path to full cost recovery, a critically important 
component of financing the global infrastructure transition required to ensure universal access to 
high quality water and sanitation services.  
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CHAPTER 1: WATER AND SANITATION SERVICE DELIVERY, PRICING, AND 
THE POOR: AN EMPIRICAL ESTIMATE OF SUBSIDY INCIDENCE IN NAIROBI, 
KENYA2 
1.1 Introduction 
The increasing block tariff (IBT) is among the most widely used tariffs by water utilities, 
particularly in developing countries. According to a recent survey of water utilities across the 
globe, 53% percent of utilities in the sample implement an IBT, with 74% percent of utilities in 
developing countries doing so (GWI 2013). In a traditional IBT, the marginal price for water use 
increases from one usage block to the next and customers are charged the marginal price for 
water use in each block accordingly. The popularity of the IBT reflects two widely held 
perceptions about its potential merits. First, policy makers believe a low marginal price in the 
lowest usage block of an IBT, often referred to as a “lifeline block”, will ensure that low-income 
households have access to a certain quantity of water at a price deemed affordable. Second, they 
believe that higher prices in the upper block(s) of the IBT can both prevent wasteful or 
extravagant water use and provide an opportunity to improve cost recovery from households who 
use more water. The intuitive appeal of the IBT rests on the implicit assumptions that all 
households have a private piped connection to the water network and that low-income 
households use less water than high-income households. 
                                                           
2 This chapter previously appeared as an article in Water Resources Research. The original citation is as follows: 
Fuente, D., Gakii Gatua, J., Ikiara, M., Kabubo-Mariara, J., Mwaura, M., Whittington, D. 2016. Water and sanitation 
service delivery, pricing, and the poor: An empirical estimate of subsidy incidence in Nairobi, Kenya, Water 
Resources Research, 52, doi:10.1002/ 2015WR018375. 
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Scholars have long questioned whether these assumptions are valid in low and middle-
income countries (Whittington 1992; Boland and Whittington 2000; Komives et al. 2005). This 
has led to a body of empirical work that has challenged common intuition about the poor, access 
to water and sanitation services, and the relationship between household income and water use 
(e.g., Komives et al. 2006; Komives et al. 2007; Banerjee et al. 2008; Banerjee and Morella 
2011; Barde and Lehman 2014). In this paper, we examine the distributional incidence of 
subsidies delivered through the increasing block water tariff in Nairobi, Kenya. We combine 
socioeconomic data from a household survey with household data on metered water use to 
estimate the distribution of subsidies among residential customers with a private metered 
connection in Nairobi. We then use a complete set of customer billing records from Nairobi City 
Water and Sewer Company (NCWSC) to estimate the distribution of subsidies among all 
residential customers, including those with shared connections. Finally, we expand the scope of 
our analysis and examine the distribution of subsidies among residential and nonresidential 
customers in Nairobi.  
Our analysis departs from existing studies in the subsidy incidence literature in three 
ways. First, studies in the literature typically use stated expenditure on water from household 
interviews to estimate water use. To our knowledge, this study is the first to combine household-
level socioeconomic data with data on metered water use to estimate subsidy incidence in the 
water sector. Second, unlike the majority of studies in the literature, we use empirical city-
specific estimates of the cost of providing water and wastewater services to estimate subsidy 
incidence. Finally, all previous studies in the literature focus on the distribution of subsidies 
among residential customers. Our study extends the literature by examining the distribution of 
subsidies among all customer classes.  
  9 
We find that the IBT implemented in Nairobi is not targeting subsidies to low-income 
households effectively. Among households with a private metered connection, households in the 
lowest wealth quintile receive less than 20% of the subsidies delivered to these customers. 
Subsidy targeting improves slightly when we examine subsidy incidence among all residential 
customers, but higher-income customers still receive a disproportionate share of subsidies. Our 
analysis of subsidy incidence among all customer classes indicates that non-residential (e.g., 
commercial, industrial, bulk water, etc.) customers, who constitute 5% of customer accounts, 
receive over a third of the subsidies delivered through the tariff. We also find that stated 
expenditure is a poor proxy for metered water and that the magnitude of the subsidy delivered 
through the water tariff is substantially larger than previous studies would suggest.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section of the paper 
discusses the issue of subsidy incidence and provides a review of the subsidy incidence literature 
in the water sector. The third and fourth sections describe our empirical strategy and the data 
used in our analysis, respectively. The fifth section presents our results. The final section 
provides a discussion of our results and some concluding remarks. 
 
1.2 Background and Literature Review 
Despite the intuitive appeal of IBTs, there are a number of reasons why the IBT may not 
effectively target subsidies to low-income households in many low- and middle-income country 
contexts. For example, in order for a household to receive a subsidy that is delivered through the 
water tariff, it must have a piped connection. However, poor households often lack a piped water 
connection and are thus largely excluded from subsidies provided through low-priced water 
delivered through a piped connection. Similarly, low-income households are also often more 
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likely than wealthier households to have a shared connection to the piped water network (e.g., a 
yard tap) and to live in multi-unit dwellings that are served by a single meter. Households that 
share a connection or live in a multi-unit dwelling served by a single meter pay a higher 
volumetric price for water than if they had an individual meter because the collective water use 
of those who share a connection falls in the upper, more expensive, blocks of the IBT. Finally, 
the extent to which household income and water use are highly correlated is an empirical 
question, even among households with a private piped connection. Indeed, the limited empirical 
evidence in the literature suggests that the correlation between household income and water use 
is much less than commonly assumed (Whittington et al. 2015).   
Concerns about the extent to which the IBT, and utility tariffs more broadly, can be used 
to effectively target subsidies to low-income households has led to a body of empirical research 
on subsidy incidence. (See Appendix 1-1for a summary of studies that have been published on 
subsidy incidence since 2000.) To calculate the distributional incidence of subsidies delivered 
through the water tariff, the analyst needs information on the magnitude of the subsidy received 
by each household and the relative income or wealth of each household. The subsidy received by 
each household is the difference between what it costs to provide the particular household with a 
particular level of service (e.g., water or water and wastewater service) and what the household 
actually pays for this service.   
The cost of serving each household is a function of households’ water use, whether the 
household has only water or water and wastewater service (i.e., their “level of service”), and the 
unit cost of providing water and wastewater services. The amount households pay for water and 
sanitation service is a function of households’ water use, their level of service, and the tariff the 
utility uses to calculate their monthly bill for water and sanitation services. Thus, in total the 
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analyst must have five pieces of information to estimate subsidy incidence: households’ water 
use, households’ service level, the unit cost of providing water and wastewater services, the 
tariff, and some measure of households’ wealth or socioeconomic status. Assembling this 
information can be quite difficult in practice. (See Gomez-Lobo et al. (2000) for an overview of 
information and modeling challenges associated with designing water and sanitation tariffs.) 
For example, data on households’ socioeconomic status and demographics are typically 
available in secondary household survey data, such as national income and expenditure surveys, 
World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) data, and some national censuses. 
However, these surveys typically do not contain information on household water use. Similarly, 
utility billing records contain information on household water use, provided customers are 
metered, the meters are working, and the utility regularly reads customers’ meters. Due to 
confidentiality requirements, however, it is typically not possible to match household level 
socioeconomic data in nationally representative household income and expenditure surveys and 
customer data in utility billing records.    
Because it can be difficult or not possible to obtain good measures of both socioeconomic 
status and water use for the same household, studies in the literature typically use a single data 
source to obtain information on both households’ socioeconomic status and water use. In 
particular, most studies use households’ stated expenditure on water to estimate households’ 
water use. They collect this information either through primary household surveys (e.g., Foster 
2004, Bardasi and Wodon 2008, and Angel-Urdinola and Wodon 2012) or from nationally 
representative household budget and expenditure surveys (e.g., World Bank LSMS data). (See 
Appendix 1-2 for a discussion of why stated expenditure may not be a good proxy for metered 
water use.) 
  12 
Studies in the subsidy incidence literature (Appendix 1-1) address the issue of cost in 
three general ways. (Appendix 1-3 provides a summary of cost estimates used in the literature.) 
First, studies may use generic cost estimates, or international benchmarks, to calculate subsidy 
incidence (e.g., Komives et al. 2005, Komives et al. 2006, Foster and Yepes 2006). Common 
sources for generic cost estimates include GWI (2004) and Kingdom et al. (2004). Other studies 
use empirical, site-specific cost estimates (e.g., Groom et al. 2008, Banerjee and Morella 2011, 
Walker et al. 2000). However, these studies typically do not explicitly state what the cost 
estimates include or precisely how they were derived. Finally, studies may make ad hoc 
assumptions about the cost of providing water and wastewater services. For example, Barde and 
Lehmann (2014) assume that the average tariff currently implemented in Lima, Peru 
(approximately 0.64 USD/m3) represents full cost recovery. 
There is broad consensus in the literature that de facto subsidies delivered through the 
water tariff are poorly targeted and largely regressive (see Appendix 1-1). Indeed, many studies 
find that subsidies delivered through the water tariff perform worse than if the subsidies were 
equally distributed among the population. This is principally due to the fact that low-income 
households are less likely to have a private connection to the piped water network and, thus, do 
not receive subsidies delivered through the water tariff.   
Studies that examine subsidy incidence only among households with a piped connection 
also find that subsidies are poorly targeted. This is primarily because income and water use are 
often not highly correlated and the tariff implemented by many utilities is not sufficient to cover 
the cost of providing service. These empirical results are supported by simulations conducted by 
Whittington et al. (2015) that suggest little can be done to improve subsidy targeting when tariffs 
are not sufficient to cover costs.  
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There are three main gaps in the water literature on subsidy incidence. First, studies in the 
literature either focus only on subsidies associated with the delivery of piped water service or do 
not explicitly state whether they include subsidies associated with wastewater service. Piped 
wastewater services are usually more expensive to provide than piped water services. To the 
extent that wastewater services are sold below cost and to the extent that higher-income 
households are more likely to have connections to the piped wastewater network, estimates in the 
literature may overestimate the performance of subsidies delivered through the tariff.   
Second, nearly all of the studies in the literature use stated expenditure to estimate water 
use, which may be a poor proxy for metered water use. Thus, it is unclear whether the broad 
consensus in the literature is attributable to the fact that studies use the same, potentially flawed, 
measure of water use.  
Finally, all of the studies in Appendix 1-1 focus on subsidy incidence only among 
residential customers. This is not surprising given that these studies use data from household 
surveys. As a result, however, the literature ignores the distributional issues between residential 
and non-residential (e.g., commercial, industrial, bulk, etc.) customers. Depending on the tariff 
applied to non-residential customers, failing to include non-residential customers may over or 
understate the magnitude of total subsidies delivered through the water tariff. 
 
1.3 Empirical Strategy  
This study was designed to fill these gaps in the subsidy incidence literature. Our 
empirical strategy proceeds in three analytical steps. In the first step of our analysis, we combine 
socioeconomic and demographic data from a survey of 656 households with data on metered 
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water use from NCWSC billing records. We use these data to: 1) estimate the distribution of 
subsidies among households with a private metered connection, and 2) examine the extent to 
which stated expenditure is an accurate proxy of metered water use. We focus this first step of 
the analysis on households with a private metered connection to capture the relationship between 
household income and water use. Households who shared a connection with another household 
or family were excluded from our survey sample.  
According to the most recent census, less than a quarter of households in Nairobi 
reported using a private connection to the piped water network as their primary drinking source 
(KNBS 2009). Approximately half of households used piped water that is not delivered into their 
dwelling (e.g. a shared tap) as their primary drinking water source. Thus, in the second step of 
our analysis, we examine the distribution of subsidies among all NCWSC’s residential 
customers, which includes residential customers with shared connections. In the third, final, step 
we expand the scope of our analysis to examine the distribution of subsidies among residential 
and non-residential customers in Nairobi.  
 
1.3.1 Subsidy Incidence 
We obtained information on customer water use from 21 months of NCWSC’s billing 
records. Like many utilities, NCWSC does not read each meter every month. (NCWSC reads 
approximately 75% of meters each month.) To address this, we calculate monthly water use 
directly from actual meter readings in the NCWSC billing data as described in Equation 1.1. 
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𝑊𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = [
𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
] ∙ 30.5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 (1.1) 
where: 
• WUSEi,t is the water use for household i in month t; 
• READINGi,t is the meter reading for household i in month t; 
• READINGi,t-1 is the previous actual meter reading for household i;  
• RDATEi,t is the date on which NCWSC read the meter for household i in month t; and  
• RDATEi,t-1 is the date of the previous actual meter reading for household i. 
We then use the estimates of households’ monthly water use obtained in Equation 1.1 to 
calculate households’ average monthly water use over the period covered by the billing records. 
We define the subsidy received by each customer as the difference between the cost to 
serve each household and what the households pay for service. Our analysis of NCWSC’s billing 
records confirms that the utility implements the official tariff (Table 1.1) to calculate customers’ 
water and sewer bills. Thus, we calculate how much a customer pays by applying NCWSC’s 
official tariff to our estimates of customers’ average monthly water use. (NCWSC implements an 
IBT with 4 usage blocks. In addition to the fixed charge for meter rent, NCWSC applies a 
minimum charge for 10 m3/mo. Households that use less than 10 m3/mo. are charged for 10 
m3/mo. NCWSC charges customers with a connection to the sewer network an additional 75% of 
the volumetric portion of their water bill for wastewater service.) 
We define the cost of serving a particular customer as in Equation 1.2. 
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𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 = 𝑊𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑖 ∙ 𝑊𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝐼𝑤𝑤,𝑖 ∙ (𝑊𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑖 ∙ 𝑊𝑊𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇) (1.2) 
where: 
• COSTi is the average monthly cost of serving household i (USD/month);  
• WUSEi is the average water use of household i from Equation 1.1 (m3/month);  
• WCOST is the average volumetric cost of providing water service (USD/m3); 
• WWCOST is the average volumetric cost of providing wastewater service (USD/m3); and 
• Iww,i is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a household has wastewater service 
and 0 otherwise.  
We develop empirical estimates of the average cost of providing water and wastewater 
services. Our cost estimates include both operations and maintenance as well as capital costs. 
They do not include the opportunity cost of the raw water supply. We estimate subsidy shares, 
the share of subsidies received by different groups of customers, to assess subsidy incidence. 
(Note that we do not examine affordability because this requires making ad hoc assumptions 
about what is and is not “affordable”.) Equation 1.3 defines the share of subsidies going to a 
particular group of customers.  
 
𝑆𝑗 =
∑ 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=1
∑ ∑ 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=1
𝐽
𝑗=1
 
(1.3) 
where: 
• Sj is the share of subsidies received by customer group j (j=1…J), and 
• SUBi is the share of subsidies received by household i.  
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In the first step of our analysis, j indexes the five wealth quintiles of our survey sample. 
In the second step, j indexes accounts located in low income areas and accounts in non-low 
income areas. In the final step of our analysis, j indexes residential, non-residential, kiosk, and 
bulk customer classes.  
 
1.3.2 Stated Expenditure as a Proxy for Water Use 
We also examine whether stated expenditure is an accurate proxy for metered water use 
by estimating household water use from households’ stated expenditure on water and comparing 
this to their metered water use. To do this, we ask households if they can recall the amount of 
their last bill from NCWSC and the number of months of service the bill covered.  Equation 1.4 
shows how we impute water use for customers with only piped water service. We use an 
analogous approach to impute water use for customers with both water and sewer service.  
 
 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑖  = (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑆𝑖 − 𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇) 𝑝1 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑆𝑖 > 0 & 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑆𝑖 ≤ 𝑏1𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤 ⁄  (1.4) 
                            = 𝑏1 + (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑆𝑖 − 𝑏1𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤) 𝑝2 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑆𝑖 > 𝑏1𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤 & 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑆𝑖 ≤ 𝑏2𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤 ⁄  
                            = 𝑏2 + (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑆𝑖 − 𝑏2𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤) 𝑝3 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑆𝑖 > 𝑏2𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤 & 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑆𝑖 ≤ 𝑏3𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤 ⁄  
      = 𝑏3 + (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑆𝑖 − 𝑏3𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤) 𝑝4 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑆𝑖 > 𝑏3𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤  ⁄  
where: 
• IMPUSEi is the imputed water use for household i (m3/mo.); 
• EXPSi is the stated expenditure for household i (KSH/mo.); 
• RENT is the monthly meter rent charged in the NCWSC tariff (Table 1.1); 
• pX is the volumetric price for water in the Xth block in the NCWSC tariff (Table 1.1);  
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• bX is the volumetric upper bound for the Xth block in the NCWSC tariff (Table 1.1); and 
• bXmaxw is the amount a water customer would be charged for consuming the maximum 
amount in the Xth block of the NCWSC tariff. 
 
1.4 Data 
 
The first step of our analysis examines subsidy incidence among households with a 
private connection to the piped water network. For this analysis, we use data from a sample of 
656 households that were randomly drawn from two of Nairobi’s six service regions, which were 
purposefully selected to ensure income heterogeneity in our sample. (See Appendix 1-4 for a 
detailed description of the survey and sampling strategy.) The survey was conducted between 
November 2013 and January 2014 and collected a range of socioeconomic and demographic 
information from households, including data on monthly income, household expenditure, and 
asset ownership. Following Filmer and Pritchett (2001) and Filmer and Scott (2008), we use 
principal component analysis to construct an asset index to serve as a proxy for wealth (see 
Appendix 1-5). We use the asset index as our primary proxy for wealth because approximately 
15% of respondents in our sample refused to provide information about their monthly household 
income. (Assets included in the index include: liquid propane gas (LPG) as a main cooking fuel, 
biomass or kerosene as a main cooking fuel, separate kitchen, security guard, connection to the 
electricity grid, mobile phone, internet connection, TV, radio, computer, private car, washing 
machine, refrigerator, borewell, and additional land in/out of Nairobi.)   
We obtain information on customer water use from 21 months of NCWSC’s billing 
records. The billing data cover the period from August 2012 to May 2014. The principal 
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challenge in our empirical strategy was to identify households in our survey sample in the billing 
records. Like many cities in developing countries, Nairobi does not have a formal system of 
addresses. Thus, it was not possible to first construct our sample from the billing records and 
then locate households to conduct the household survey. To address this, we used households’ 
account numbers to identify households in our sample in the billing records. Because households 
do not typically know their NCWSC account number, however, we obtained households’ 
account numbers by matching the serial number on households’ water meter with the account 
number on the NCWSC marketing assistant’s itinerary. When possible we verified the the 
account number with a physical copy of a household’s recent water bill. (Fifty-six percent of 
households in our sample were able to show enumerators a copy of their water bill. All account 
numbers matched the accounts associated with the meter serial numbers.) 
We use data from five years of audited financial statements (FY 2007 to 2012) to 
estimate NCWSC’s average operations and maintenance costs. We derive capital cost estimates 
from data in NCWSC’s water master plan (MoWI & AWSB 2014) and interviews with senior 
water and sanitation engineers at NCWSC, Athi Water Services Board, and local engineering 
firms. Table 1.2 presents the cost estimates we use in our analysis. Assuming 35% non-revenue 
water, we estimate the full cost (O&M plus capital costs) of water service to be 1.40 USD/m3 
and 1.46 USD/m3 for wastewater service. (Non-revenue water refers to water the utility produces 
but for which it does not receive revenue.) These estimates are higher than the cost estimates 
used in many studies, but of similar magnitude to the cost estimates in GWI (2004) and Kingdom 
et al. (2004) once non-revenue is accounted for (see Tables A1-3a and A1-3b in Appendix 1-3).   
For the analysis of subsidy incidence among all residential customers and among all 
customer classes, we obtain information on the water use of NCWSC’s approximately 180,000 
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residential customers from 21 months of NCWSC’s billing records. NCWSC does not have 
socioeconomic or demographic information about its customers. In the absence of household-
level data on income or socioeconomic status, one could potentially use household budget and 
expenditure survey data or recent census data to obtain aggregate data on household 
characteristics. This is not possible in Nairobi for two reasons. First, the most recent Kenya 
Integrated Household Budget and Expenditure Survey (2005-6) contains only 685 observations 
from Nairobi. Second, data from the most recent census are not publicly available.  
To address this, we use the geographic location of customer accounts as a proxy for 
relative wealth. In particular, we use the GIS location of customer accounts to identify which 
accounts are located in low-income areas. Information on the GIS location of each account was 
collected by NCWSC as part of a pilot program to conduct meter reading with smartphones. As 
of May 2015, approximately 85% of the 180,000 residential customer accounts were geocoded.  
We obtain information on the location and extent of low-income areas in Nairobi from 
the MajiData project of Kenya’s Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MoWI) and Water Services 
Trust Fund (WSTF) (MoWI & WSTF 2015). The MajiData project is a multi-year effort to 
create a database of information related to water and sanitation service provision in all of 
Kenya’s urban low-income areas. As part of this process, the MajiData team identified and 
mapped low income areas in the service area of each Water Service Provider in Kenya using 
publicly available data, stakeholder consultations, and transect walks of each service area (MoWI 
& WSTF 2008). MajiData’s classification of low-income areas includes informal settlements, 
planned areas with planned low income housing, and informal housing in planned residential 
areas. To our knowledge, this information is the most comprehensive, up to date mapping of 
low-income areas in Nairobi.  
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For our analysis of subsidy incidence among all customer classes, we obtain water use 
data from the same set of NCWSC billing records described above. NCWSC billing data include 
13 different customer classes. We group these customer classes into four general types: 
residential, non-residential, bulk, and kiosk. Our non-residential customer type includes accounts 
classified as government, community, and industrial. 
 
1.5 Results  
 
1.5.1 Household Survey – Subsidy Incidence 
Table 1.3 presents information on selected characteristics of households in our survey 
sample. The average household in our sample has four members, which is consistent with the 
average household size in Nairobi from the latest census. Approximately half of the households 
in our sample rent their home. Over ninety percent of households in our sample have a sewer 
connection. Seventy-eight percent of households in our survey report using their piped water 
connection as their primary drinking water source. The remaining 22% report using bottled water 
for their primary drinking water source. Over a quarter of households in our sample report 
purchasing water from a vendor in the previous year, which reflects the fact that NCWSC does 
not provide customers 24x7 water service.  
Mean and median water use in our survey sample are 19 m3/mo. and 13 m3/mo., 
respectively (Figure 1.1). Average water use among all residential customers in the NCWSC 
billing data is 31 m3/mo. However, the mean water use of households on meter-reader itineraries 
with 100% individual meters is 20 m3/mo., similar to what we find in our sample of households.  
Nearly 40% of households in the sample fall in the lifeline block (0 to 10 m3/mo.). Over 80% of 
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the households in the sample have water use that falls in the first two usage blocks (below 30 
m3/mo.). Only 4% of the sample falls in the upper-most block of NCWSC’s tariff (>60 m3/mo.).  
We find considerable heterogeneity in water use, both within and across wealth quintiles. 
(This heterogeneity persists if we examine only three wealth groups.) Figure 1.2 plots household 
water use versus the households’ wealth index score. The correlation between a household’s 
wealth index score and water use in our sample is 0.20. Mean water use is 16 m3/hh/mo. for 
households in the first (lowest) wealth quintile and 30 m3/hh/mo. for households in the fifth 
(highest) wealth quintile (Table 1.4).  
Table 1.4 also shows the average monthly bill for households in the five wealth quintiles. 
The mean bill for households in the lowest quintile is 931 KSH/hh/mo. (approximately 10 
USD/hh/mo.). The mean bill for households in the highest wealth quintile is 1509 KSH/hh/mo. 
(approximately 17 USD/hh/mo.). As a point of comparison, the mean water and sewer bill for 
households in the lowest quintile is only 60% of what these households report paying for 
electricity. For the wealthiest households in the sample, the mean bill is less than a quarter of 
what they report spending on electricity.  
Table 1.4 presents the average price paid by households in each wealth quintile. For the 
full sample, the mean average price ranges from 79 KSH/m3 (0.90 USD/m3) to 50 KSH/m3 (0.56 
USD/m3) across wealth quintiles. The mean average price for households in the lowest wealth 
quintile is 70 KSH/m3 (0.79 USD/m3) and 50 KSH/m3 (0.56 USD/m3) for households in the 
highest wealth quintile. Households in the lowest quintile face a higher average price than 
households in in the highest quintile because the tariff includes both a positive fixed and 
minimum charge (e.g., customers are charged for 10 m3/mo. regardless of their water use). These 
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average price estimates reflect the fact that over 90% of households in our sample have a sewer 
connection.  
Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of subsidies across wealth quintiles. If the subsidy were 
evenly, or randomly, distributed among the population, each wealth quintile would receive 20% 
of the total subsidy. A well-targeted subsidy would deliver a substantial share of the total 
subsidies to low-income households. In our sample, households in the lowest quintile receive 
only 16% of the total subsidy. Households in the top three wealth quintiles receive nearly 70% of 
the total subsidy, with households in the highest wealth quintile receiving almost 30% of the total 
subsidy.  
 
1.5.2 Household Survey – Stated Expenditure as a Proxy for Metered Water Use 
During the survey, we asked households if they can recall the amount of their last bill 
from NCWSC. Nearly 85% of households in our sample indicated that they could, considerably 
higher than the 30% percent reported in Foster (2004). Figure 1.4 presents a scatter plot of 
metered versus imputed water use for households who could recall the amount of their previous 
water bill. The 45-degree line in Figure 1.4 traces a line of equality for which imputed and 
metered water use would be the same for each household. The scatter plot in Figure 1.4 displays 
a high degree of dispersion, indicating that stated expenditure does not provide an accurate proxy 
for metered water use in our sample.  
We find that stated expenditure typically overestimates households’ water use, often by a 
substantial amount. This is reflected in Table 1.5, which provides summary statistics of metered 
water use and imputed water use from households in our sample. Average metered water use 
among households who could recall the amount of their last water bill was approximately 19 
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m3/mo. The average water use imputed from stated expenditure among the sample, however, was 
27 m3/mo. (42% higher).  
 
1.5.3 Subsidy Incidence Among All Residential Customers 
The results presented above examine subsidy incidence among our survey sample, all of 
whom had a private piped connection. In the second step of our analysis we expand the scope of 
our inquiry to examine subsidy incidence among all residential customers. This analysis includes 
households with a private piped connection as well as households served by a shared connection. 
NCWSC does not have information on whether accounts are served by shared or individual 
connections. Thus, the results below examine subsidy incidence among all residential customers 
and do not directly address water use or subsidy incidence among accounts with shared and 
individual connections.  
Approximately 20% of residential customer accounts in NCWSCs billing records are 
located in low-income areas identified in the MajiData database. Table 1.6 provides a summary 
of water use among residential accounts of different income levels. The mean and median water 
use in accounts located in low-income areas is 30 m3/mo. and 12 m3/mo., respectively. This is 
only slightly lower than the mean (33 m3/mo.) and median (14 m3/mo.) water use of accounts 
that are not located in low-income areas.  
Figure 1.5 provides a summary of subsidy incidence among all NCWSC’s residential 
customers. Accounts located in low-income areas constitute 19% of residential accounts and 
receive 21% of the total subsidies delivered to residential customers. This is approximately the 
same amount of subsidies that low-income customers would receive if the subsidy were evenly 
distributed among residential customers. 
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1.5.4 Subsidy Incidence among all Customer Classes 
We now turn to the results for subsidy incidence among all customer classes. Residential 
accounts constitute 94% of NCWSC customers (Table 1.7). Nonresidential accounts represent 
5% of NCWSC customers. The remaining 1% of accounts are official public kiosks and bulk 
customers.  
Despite the fact that residential accounts make up the vast majority of NCWSC 
customers, they account for only 57% of the overall water use and 56% of total billings (Table 
1.7). Non-residential customers, on the other hand, account for 35% of the overall water use and 
41% of total billings.  
We find that non-residential customers receive 31% of the total subsidy. By contrast, 
residential customers receive 63% of the total subsidy delivered through the water tariff. Among 
residential customers, accounts in high-income itineraries represent 21% of accounts and receive 
19% of the total subsidy. Accounts in low-income itineraries represent 14% of total accounts and 
receive only 9% of the total subsidies, far less than if subsidies were randomly distributed among 
customers. 
 
1.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Our analysis of subsidy incidence among a sample of 656 households in Nairobi with a 
private metered connection indicates that households in the lowest wealth quintile receive only 
15% of the total subsidies delivered to households in our sample. In contrast, households in the 
highest wealth quintile receive nearly 30% of the subsidies. Thus, among our sample of 
  26 
customers with a private metered connection, the current water tariff performs worse than if the 
subsidy was randomly distributed among households.  
In Nairobi, the poor targeting of the subsidies even among households with a private 
metered connection is driven by a combination of three factors. First, very few customers’ water 
use falls in the uppermost blocks of NCWSC’s IBT (Figure 1.1). Indeed, over 80% of 
households in our sample fall in the first two blocks of NCWSC’s tariff. Thus, irrespective of the 
prices in each block there is not a sufficient number of customers in the upper blocks to enable a 
meaningful level of cross-subsidy. Second, at current prices nearly all customers are being 
subsidized. The average price paid for water and sanitation services among the wealth quintiles 
in our sample ranges from 0.56 USD/m3 to 0.90 USD/m3. In contrast, we estimate the full cost of 
providing water and sanitation services in Nairobi to be approximately 2.86 USD/m3. When 
nearly all customers are subsidized, it is not possible for a subsidy delivered through the tariff to 
effectively target subsidies to intended beneficiaries. Finally, contrary to common intuition, we 
find a low correlation between our wealth proxy and water use, which is consistent with the 
limited data that exist in the literature (Whittington et al. 2015).  
We also find that stated expenditure is a poor proxy for metered water use. Despite the 
significant measurement error associated with using stated expenditure as a proxy for water use, 
we find that using stated expenditure to estimate subsidy incidence does not change the policy 
implications of our results. This is true in our sample because the majority of NCWSC customers 
have arrears or credits on their accounts, and we find a low correlation between income and 
whether customers have arrears or credits. This may not be true in other places. Thus, our 
findings suggest that researchers should exercise caution when using stated expenditure to 
estimate water use.  
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When we expand our analysis to the distribution of subsidies among all NCWSC’s 
180,000 residential customers, we find that subsidy incidence improves very slightly.  Among all 
residential customers, customers located in low-income areas account for approximately 19% of 
total residential accounts and receive 21% of the total subsidies delivered to residential 
customers. This seemingly counterintuitive result can be explained by the fact that low-income 
customers are more likely to have shared connections, which register high levels of water use, 
and all water use is subsidized at current prices. While subsidy targeting among all residential 
customers is slightly better than subsidy incidence among only households with a private 
connection, errors of inclusion remain high and customers in low-income areas are no better off 
than if subsidies were randomly distributed among residential customers.   
Finally, our analysis of subsidy incidence among all customer classes indicates that non-
residential customers receive over one-third of the total subsidies delivered through NCWSC’s 
tariff. Residential customers receive only 63% of the total subsidies. This is not surprising given 
that all customers are subsidized at current prices and non-residential customers account for 
nearly 40% of total water use. However, policy makers often implement an IBT with a lifeline 
block specifically to target subsidies to low-income, residential customers. We find that this is 
not occurring in Nairobi. Our results highlight the importance of examining subsidy incidence 
among all customer classes, which has largely been ignored in the literature.  
In addition to our findings related to subsidy incidence, our analysis raises important 
issues about the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through the water tariff. Most studies on 
subsidy incidence focus on subsidies associated with piped water service among only residential 
customers. They do not examine subsidies associated with sewer service or subsidies delivered to 
non-residential customers. Our analysis suggests that limiting the scope of subsidy incidence in 
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this manner would lead to a substantial underestimate of the magnitude of the subsidy delivered 
through the water tariff.  
In Nairobi, examining subsidies associated with piped water service among residential 
customers would result in a total subsidy that is approximately 40% less than the subsidy 
associated with both piped water and sanitation services for residential customers. Similarly, we 
find that examining subsidies associated with both piped water and sewer services among only 
residential customers would underestimate the total subsidy delivered through the water tariff by 
45%. In total, focusing only on subsidies associated with providing water service to residential 
customers would underestimate the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through the water tariff 
by 65%. We estimate that the total subsidy delivered through the tariff is approximately one and 
half times NCWSC’s total billings.  
Policy makers in the water sector often express concern about the affordability of water 
and wastewater services, especially for low-income households. This concern is often misplaced 
because the poorest residents in cities typically rely on vended water from public kiosks or 
private vendors. (For example, in Nairobi the price of vended water from public kiosks is 2 
KSH/20L (1.11 USD/m3), which is closer to full cost recovery for water supply (1.40 USD/m3) 
than the volumetric price for water in the tariff applied to metered residential connections.) 
Nonetheless, policy makers’ concern about affordability is often the primary justification for 
keeping water prices low and for implementing an IBT that includes a lifeline block. Our 
findings add to a growing body of empirical literature that suggests that IBTs implemented by 
many utilities do not effectively target subsidies to low-income households. In Nairobi, we find 
this is particularly true when examining subsidy incidence among all customer classes, but also 
when we restrict our analysis to households with private metered connections. This is striking 
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given that the poorest households often lack access to piped water and sanitation services 
altogether. This growing body of evidence suggests that the IBT is an ineffective and often 
expensive means of delivering subsidies to low-income households. Thus, if policy makers want 
to subsidize water and sanitation services for low-income households, they should explore 
alternative subsidy delivery mechanisms, including both connection subsidies and means-tested 
subsidies (i.e., subsidies for which households must meet an income or wealth criteria). 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1.1. Summary of the Tariff Implemented by Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company. 
 
Tariff Component  
Residential, Commercial, and Industrial 
0 to 10b m3/mo. 0.22 USD/m3 
11 to 30 m3/mo. 0.45 USD/m3 
31 to 60 m3/mo. 0.50 USD/m3 
> 60 m3/mo. 0.63 USD/m3 
Water Kiosk   
All units 0.18 USD/m3 
Bulk Supply   
All units 0.31 USD/m3 
Other Charges   
Seweragec  75% 
Meter Rent 0.59 USD/mo. 
Connection Charges 29 USD 
a Conversion rate = 90 KSH/USD.   
b Customers charged for a minimum of 10 m3/mo. 
c Applied to the volumetric component of the water bill. 
 
Table 1.2. Summary of Cost Estimates Used to Calculate Subsidy Incidence 
 
Cost Component USD/m3 a 
Water Serviceb 1.40 
O&M 0.30 
Capital Costsc 1.10 
Wastewater Serviceb 1.46 
Operations & Maintenance 0.30 
Capital Costsc 1.16 
a Conversion rate = 90 KSH/USD.   
b Cost estimates assume 35% non-revenue water. 
c 10% real discount rate; 30-year average useful life of 
capital.  
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Table 1.3. Basic Characteristics of Households Surveyed 
 
Household Characteristic Value 
Household size (s.d.)* 4 
 (1.78) 
Home owner 51% 
Primary drinking water source  
Piped water connection 78% 
Bottled water 22% 
Water vendor (previous year) 26% 
Household water treatment 68% 
Sewer connection 93% 
*Standard deviation 
 
 
 
Table 1.4. Water Use, Representative Bill, and Average Price among Wealth Quintiles 
 
    Wealth Quintile   
  Unit 1 2 3 4 5 Overall 
Mean water use (s.d.)* m3/hh/mo. 16 14 14 24 30 19 
  (30) (15) (17) (25) (32) (26) 
Representative water bill USD/hh/mo. 10.35 8.39 8.19 14.18 16.76 11.58 
Average price USD/m3 0.79 0.90 0.83 0.62 0.56 0.74 
*Standard deviation 
 
 
 
Table 1.5. Summary Statistics for the Distributions of Metered and Imputed Water Use 
 
Water Use Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Metered m3/mo. 19 24 0.7 292 
Imputed m3/mo. 27 34 0.3 436 
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Table 1.6. Summary of Water Use Among NCWSC Residential Customers 
 
Residential Area 
Water Use  
(m3/acct./mo.) 
 Classification Mean Median Std. Dev 
Low income 33 14 220 
Middle/high-
income 30 12 127 
All residential 31 12 194 
 
 
 
Table 1.7. Summary of the Share of Accounts, Water Use, Billings, and Subsidies Among Four 
NCWSC Customer Classes 
 
Customer 
Class 
% Total 
Accounts 
% Total 
Water 
Use 
% Total 
Billings 
% Total 
Subsidy 
Residential 94% 57% 56% 63% 
Non-residential 5% 35% 41% 31% 
Kiosk <1% 3% 1% 2% 
Bulk <1% 4% 2% 3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Figure 1.1. Distribution of Water Use among Survey Sample with NCWSC Tariff Blocks 
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* Nine observations with water use above 100 m3/mo. not shown on the graph for scale purposes. 
Figure 1.2. Scatter Plot of Monthly Household Water Use Versus Wealth. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Share of Subsidies Received by Each Wealth Quintile. 
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Figure 1.4. Imputed Versus Metered Water Use 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5. Share of Total Residential Accounts and Subsidies Received by Accounts in Low-
income and Middle/High-income Areas 
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CHAPTER 2: ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF TARIFFS FOR WATER AND 
SANITATION SERVICES – A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) for water and sanitation seek to ensure access 
to safe and affordable water and sanitation services for all by 2030. This represents a major shift 
in global ambition both with respect to the scope of the goals – universal access – as well as the 
target level of service. The SDGs defines “safe” service as service that is safely managed, 
available on premise, and there when needed. According to a recent study by the World Bank, it 
will cost approximately 100 billion USD per year to meet the SDGs for water and sanitation 
(Hutton and Varughese 2016). This estimate does not include the cost of maintaining, repairing, 
or replacing countries’ existing infrastructure stock, or the cost of investing in infrastructure that 
is resilience to climate change.  
While many low and middle income countries face the challenge of investing in their first 
generation of water and sanitation infrastructure, the water and sanitation infrastructure in many 
industrialized countries is reaching, or has reached, the end of its useful life and is now failing. In 
the United States, the American Society of Civil Engineering has given the nation’s water and 
sanitation infrastructure a grade of D+, indicating that the infrastructure is in poor condition. 
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According to the American Water Works Association and American Society for Civil 
Engineers, it will cost approximately one trillion dollars to replace the United States’ water 
infrastructure network and 300 billion dollars to meet the United States’ wastewater and storm 
water capital requirements (ASCE 2013). These estimates also do not include the cost of 
investing in climate-resilient water and sanitation infrastructure.  
There are three general ways in which governments can finance the infrastructure 
transition that is on the horizon in both less developed and industrialized countries in the coming 
decades: taxes, tariffs (i.e., user fees), and transfers from donors. Given the magnitude of the 
infrastructure challenge, governments will need to deploy each of these to ensure their citizens 
have access to high quality water and sanitation services. In this paper, we present the results of a 
systematic review of the empirical literature on the pricing of water and sanitation services, 
highlighting ways in which insights from the literature might inform water and sanitation service 
pricing and identifying areas for future research.  
Overall, we find that the empirical literature on pricing municipal water and sanitation 
services is diverse and relatively fragmented. Studies identified through our systematic review 
are published in a wide range of journals and vary considerably with respect to their core aims, 
methods, number of tariffs examined, and the indicators of tariff performance considered. 
Studies typically examine a subset of objectives commonly associated with water pricing and 
tariff reform, including economic efficiency, cost recovery, affordability, and equity. We find 
that the majority of studies examine two or fewer objectives, limiting the extent to which the 
literature characterizes the tradeoffs policy makers often face when setting tariffs for municipal 
water and sanitation services. We also find that while several studies in the literature show that it 
is possible to design welfare-improving tariffs, the welfare gains from implementing these tariffs 
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are relatively small. Finally, we find that the majority of studies focus on municipal water pricing 
in industrialized countries, highlighting an opportunity for additional research on municipal 
water pricing in low and middle-income countries.   
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The second section of the paper 
describes the methodology we employed to conduct the systematic literature review. The third 
section provides an overview of the papers identified in the systematic review, including the 
primary focus of the papers, methods employed, and indicators of tariff performance examined. 
The fourth section provides a discussion of main themes identified in our review. The fifth and 
final section highlights areas for future research and provides concluding remarks.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
 
Our systematic review of the empirical literature on the performance of water tariffs 
follows the methodology recommended by PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic 
Reviews and Meta-analyses)3.  This approach to a systematic literature review consists of five 
basic steps. First, the researcher defines Boolean search terms. This is done by trial and error on 
select databases with two objectives in mind: 1) the search term must be broad enough to capture 
all the references the researcher has previously identified as relevant or essential based on their 
knowledge of the field, and 2) the search terms must also be specific enough to produce a 
manageable set of papers to review.4  
                                                           
3 http://www.prisma-statement.org/ 
4 What constitutes manageable is, of course, subjective.  
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In the second step, the researcher uses these search terms to query a defined set of 
publication databases. The researcher next compiles a list of non-duplicate references from these 
databases and then iteratively refines the list to obtain a core set of papers. Once the researcher 
has assembled a core set of studies, the researcher adds relevant literature identified through 
citations in the core literature, supplemental literature searches, and expert opinion.  
Following this methodology, we defined and refined a key set of Boolean search terms 
related to the pricing of water and sanitation services.5 We then used the Boolean search terms to 
query four academic search engines: Web of Science, SCOPUS, Academic Search Complete, 
and Business Search Complete. (Table 2.1 provides a summary of the number of references 
identified in each database.) We imported the citations from the respective search on each 
database into citation management software and then removed duplicate citations. In total, this 
search produced 939 unique references.  
Next, we iteratively screened the 939 references to obtain a core set of relevant literature. 
(Figure 2.1 provides a schematic of the literature-screening process.) In particular, we reviewed 
the title of each reference to identify and remove references that did not focus on domestic or 
municipal water supply. During this process, we also removed studies that focused on hedonic 
valuation or energy as well as conference proceedings. This initial screening identified 513 
references that were not relevant to this study.  
We then re-examined the titles of the remaining 426 references to identify articles that 
specifically focused on municipal water and sanitation service pricing. During this step, we 
                                                           
5 The final Boolean search terms used for this systematic literature review were “water AND (drinking OR 
residential OR municipal) AND (price OR pricing OR tariff) AND (model OR modeling OR simulation OR 
simulate OR estimate)”.  
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excluded papers that focused on ground water management, river basin management, and general 
water resource management issues. We also excluded papers that solely focused on subsidy 
incidence because this literature has been reviewed elsewhere (see Whittington et al. 2015 and 
Fuente et al. 2016). We retained papers that focused on water conservation, tariff simulation, and 
the price elasticity of demand.6 This screening step identified 292 papers that were not relevant 
to this study.  
Finally, we reviewed the abstracts of the remaining 221 papers and assigned keywords to 
each study. Table 2.2 presents a summary of the keywords that emerged from this analysis as 
well as the number of papers associated with each term.7 While reviewing the papers from the 
Boolean search of the four academic databases searched, we identified 27 additional studies in 
the references of the papers that were potentially relevant to this study. We reviewed these 
papers to determine whether they met the inclusion criteria for our review.  Of the 27 additional 
studies identified during this process, 10 were added to the database of references. At this stage 
in the review process, we identified 66 papers that were potentially relevant to this review. We 
reviewed these papers to identify studies that focused specifically on water pricing, tariff 
simulation, and tariff performance. In total, we identified a set of 34 empirical papers to include 
in this review.  
 
 
                                                           
6 There is a large literature that examines the price elasticity of demand for municipal water services. This review 
only considers studies that examine the price elasticity of demand if these estimates are used to simulate the 
performance of alternative tariffs.  
7 Note that some papers were assigned more than one keyword.  
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2.3 Results 
 
Papers identified through our systematic review were published primarily in peer-
reviewed journals that focus on water or economics (Table 2.3). Several papers, however, were 
published in more general peer-reviewed journals that focus on international development or 
policy, or as book chapters and working papers. Overall, the studies identified in our review 
appear in a range of journals with a limited number of journals publishing more than one of the 
studies, as illustrated in Table 2.3. For example, both Utilities Policy and Water Resources 
Management published four of the papers identified in our literature review. Similarly, Water 
Resources Research published three studies and Water Resources and Economics, which was 
only launched in 2013, published two of the studies identified in our review. Though several 
studies in the literature appear in economics journals, they are published in different journals that 
span the fields of environmental and resource economics, development economics, and industrial 
organization.  
The rate of publication of studies that examine the performance of tariffs for municipal 
water and sanitation services has been relatively constant over the past two decades (Figure 2.2). 
The number of studies identified in our review ranges from one to three studies per year. This 
trend stands in contrast to Berg and Marques’ (2011) broader review of quantitative studies on 
water and sanitation utilities in which they document an exponential increase the number of 
studies over time. In the remainder of this section, we discuss several dimensions of the 
literature, including:  studies’ primary objectives, location, methodology, the type and number of 
tariffs compared, and the indicators used to assess tariff performance.  
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2.3.1 Primary focus, location, and service Level  
 
Nearly all of the studies identified in the systematic literature review explicitly compare 
the performance of more than one water tariff with respect to at least one indicator of tariff 
performance. Approximately one third of the studies identified through the systematic literature 
review focus primarily on modeling the outcomes and performance of different tariff structures 
(see Table 2.4). Studies that do not primarily focus on modeling different tariffs often attempt to 
derive efficient prices by estimating the price and income elasticities of demand for municipal 
water service (e.g. Diakité et al., 2009; Garcia-Valinas, 2006; Garcia-Valinas, 2005; and Garcia 
and Reynaud, 2004). Many of these studies then use empirical estimates of the price elasticity of 
demand to calculate the welfare effects of moving from the current tariff to another tariff. Studies 
that do not estimate the price elasticity of demand include Grafton and Kompas (2007), who use 
assumptions about the price elasticity of demand to calculate the price increases necessary to 
meet a minimum reservoir storage requirement and Yates et al. (2013), who estimate the welfare 
changes associated with a drought plan implemented in the El Dorado Irrigation District of 
California.  
Utilities often provide both water and sanitation services. However, the empirical 
literature on pricing water and sanitation service delivery focuses primarily on the pricing of 
water services. As shown in Table 2.3, only four of the 34 studies explicitly include wastewater 
services in their analysis. The near exclusive focus on water services in the literature may be 
explained by several factors. Utilities commonly set the price for wastewater services as a fixed 
percentage of volumetric price for water services. Additionally, many studies in the literature use 
data that is aggregated at some geographic level (e.g., municipality, county, region), which may 
not include information on the fraction of households with a connection to the wastewater 
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network or how water use differs among customers with and without access to the piped water 
network. Finally, wastewater services are often outside the primary scope of many studies. This 
is particularly true for studies that focus on estimating the price elasticity of demand for 
municipal water services.   
The studies identified in the systematic review examine the pricing of municipal water 
services in 19 different countries.8 The majority of studies examined tariffs in North America or 
Europe (Table 2.4). The majority of studies in Europe focused on France and Spain.  We 
identified three studies that examine tariffs in Sub-Saharan Africa (Diakité et al. 2009; Briand 
2006; and Cueva and Lauria 2001), one that focused on South Asia (Saleth and Dinar 2001), and 
one that focused on the Middle East (Rosenburg 2010). The prevalence of studies focusing on 
industrialized countries likely can be attributed to the fact that water pricing and tariff reforms 
have a longer history in these countries and, as a result, data are more readily available. In 
addition to studies that use data from particular countries, five studies use hypothetical data in 
their simulations (i.e., Hoffman and Du Plessis 2013; Wichelns 2013; Nauges and Whittington 
2017; and Elnaboulsi 2001).  
 
2.3.2 Number of tariffs compared 
 
Although the primary objective of many of the studies we identified in our review is not 
modeling the performance of different tariff structures, most studies did compare different tariffs 
in some manner. For example, studies either compared a different tariff structure (e.g., an IBT 
with a uniform volumetric price) or variants of the same tariff structure (e.g., an IBT with two 
                                                           
8 This includes Reynaud (2016) who uses data from nine European countries.  
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blocks and an IBT with four blocks, with different volumetric prices in each block).  Overall, 
there is a wide range in the number of tariffs compared in each study. The number of tariffs 
compared in the studies identified in the systematic literature review ranged from two to 53.  
Studies that compared only two tariffs fall into two general categories. The first category 
consists of studies that compared an existing tariff to price increases under the same tariff 
structure (e.g., Cueva and Lauria 2001; Cheeseman et al. 2008; and Di Cosmo 2011). For 
example, Cueva and Lauria (2001) compared the existing tariff in Dakar, Senegal to prices 
necessary to meet a particular cost recovery objective.  Di Cosmo (2011) examined the impact of 
a one percent increase in the volumetric price on households in Italy.  
The second category of studies that examined two tariffs includes studies that compared 
an existing tariff to an alternative tariff structure. This includes Barberán and Arbués (2009), 
who compared the existing tariff in Zaragoza, Spain to a tariff they derived to meet a particular 
equity criterion developed by the authors. Similarly, Garcia-Valinas (2005) compared the 
existing tariff in Seville, Spain to Feldstein prices9 they derived from estimates of the price 
elasticity of demand and assumptions about marginal utility of income.  
The remaining studies in the literature explicitly compared multiple tariff structures. For 
example, Renzetti (1992) examined four tariffs in Vancouver: the existing tariff, average cost 
pricing, seasonal pricing, and seasonal pricing with Ramsey prices. Diakité et al. (2009) 
                                                           
9 Feldstein pricing was first proposed by Feldstein (1972) in the optimal pricing literature as a means to address 
concerns about the distributional impacts of Ramsey-Boiteux pricing, one approach to optimal pricing under a cost 
recovery constraint. The basic aim of Ramsey-Boiteux pricing is to minimize the welfare losses associated with 
deviating marginal cost pricing. To accomplish this, Ramsey-Boiteux pricing applies what is widely referred to as 
the inverse elasticity rule, wherein consumers who are less sensitive to price changes face higher marginal prices 
than those that are more sensitive to price changes. A common critique of Ramsey-Boiteux pricing is that it may be 
regressive if low-income households are less sensitive to price changes than high income households. To address 
this, Feldstein pricing effectively weights the Ramsey-Boiteux price by the marginal utility of income, which is 
assumed to be decreasing in income. 
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compared the existing tariff in Cote d’Ivoire with four different variants of IBTs derived using 
Ramsey pricing. Rinaudo et al. (2012) compared eight tariffs in their analysis of water pricing in 
southern France: a uniform price, seasonal pricing10, and five variants of a three-block IBT. 
Using data from Sao Paolo, Brazil Ruijs et al. (2008) compared eight tariffs, including uniform 
and IBTs that incorporate means-tested discounts for low income users. More recently, Nauges 
and Whittington (2017) used hypothetical data to compare the performance of nine IBT tariff 
alternatives relative to a uniform price status quo tariff.  
 
2.3.3 Modeling framework 
 
Studies in the literature typically simulate a change from the status quo (the existing 
tariff) to a new state of the world (a new tariff) to assess the performance of various tariffs.  
There are a variety of ways researchers can model the transition from one tariff to another 
ranging from relatively simple models that forecast water use based on changes in a single 
parameter over a single time-step to more complex dynamic models that simulate tariff 
performance using systems of equations.  The first category includes models that assume a 
relationship between water use and a particular parameter (often price) as well as models that 
estimate an empirical relationship between water use and the parameter(s) of interest in a 
particular population.  
The second category of models include computable general equilibrium (CGE), agent 
based models (ABMs), and system dynamic models (SDMs) (House-Peters et al. 2011). Unlike 
the models described above, these models typically assume, rather than estimate, a functional 
                                                           
10 The author does not state whether seasonal prices are modeled as an IBT or a uniform price tariff.  
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relationship between water use and a variety of parameters drawing upon empirical evidence 
from the literature. These models then simulate water use, revenues, and (sometimes) costs based 
on a range of factors, including but not limited to the size and characteristics of the service 
population (e.g. income, household size, appliance ownership, etc.), the behavior of the service 
population, and projected changes in temperature or precipitation.  While these models can vary 
considerably with respect to geographic scale, they commonly simulate water use over a multiple 
rather than single time periods.  
The studies identified through the systematic literature review employ the full range of 
models described above. The majority of studies in the literature use econometric techniques to 
estimate the demand for water service and then use this empirical relationship to predict 
customer water use under alternative tariff structures (e.g., Renzetti 1992; Garcia-Valinas 2005; 
Diakité et al. 2009; Garcia-Valinas 2010; Rinaudo et al. 201211; Reynaud 2016). Approximately 
40 percent of studies that estimate the price elasticity of demand use household or account 
level12 data. The remaining studies that estimate the price elasticity of demand use aggregate13 
data.  
The remaining studies identified in the systematic literature review employ various 
simulation techniques. This includes hypothetical models that simulate only changes in relative 
                                                           
11 Rinaudo et al. (2012) estimate the price elasticity of demand using aggregate data from southern France and then 
predict changes in water demand using a simple functional form (C=kPɛ), where C is the quantity of water, P is the 
marginal price, ɛ is the price elasticity of demand, and k is a constant calibrated on the aggregate data.  
12 Utilities typically bill accounts associated with a particular water meter. Accounts may include multiple 
households if each household does not have an individual meter. For example, a utility may use a single meter to 
measure the water use of a multi-unit apartment building.  
13 For example, Garcia and Reynaud (2004) estimate the price elasticity of demand using data from 50 water 
utilities in France. Each utility is treated as a unit of observation and data on water use, income, and demographics 
are average values from the utilities’ service area.  
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price (Hoffman and du Plessis 2013) to more complex ABMs (Rosenberg 2010), SDMs (Ahmad 
and Prashar 2010), CGE (Briand 2006), and custom-developed software (Yates et al. 2013) that 
model the dynamic interaction between tariffs, water use, revenues, capacity expansion, costs of 
service, and other outcome variables. Three studies employ Monte Carlo analysis to simulate the 
performance of alternative tariffs (e.g., Cueva and Lauria 2001; Rosenberg 2010; Nauges and 
Whittington 2017).  Wolak (2016) used an optimization routine to derive tariffs that meet a cost 
recovery objective subject to constraints on revenue stability.  
 
2.3.4 Cost and capacity 
 
Approximately half of the studies identified in the systematic literature review explicitly 
consider the costs of water and sanitation service delivery. Several studies that incorporate costs 
in their simulation models use cost estimates derived from cost functions estimated using 
operational and financial data from utilities14 (e.g. Renzetti 1992; Kim 1995; Saleth and Dinar 
2001; Garcia and Reynaud 2004; Garcia-Valinas 2005; Diakete et al. 2009). The remaining 
studies that incorporated costs in their analysis either use average costs from utility financial 
statements (Cuevea and Lauria 2001; Rosenburg 2010) or assume average costs (Elnaboulsi 
2001; Krause et al. 2003; Briand 2006; Hall 2009; Wichelns 2013). A limited number of studies 
(e.g, Elnabousi 2001; Briand 2006; Ahmad and Prashar 2010; and Yates et al. 2013) explicitly 
incorporated capacity and capacity expansion in their simulation models.  
 
                                                           
14 Renzetti (1992) and Garcia-Valinas (2005) estimate both a short-run and long-run marginal cost function. The 
remaining studies either estimate only short run costs.  
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2.3.5 Indicators of tariff performance  
 
There are several criteria commonly used to assess the performance of water pricing and 
tariff reforms, including but not limited to: revenue sufficiency (i.e., cost recovery), revenue 
stability, economic efficiency, water conservation, equity, fairness, and simplicity and public 
acceptability.15  Studies in the literature typically examined tariffs relative to four general 
objectives of tariff making: economic efficiency, conservation, cost recovery, and affordability 
(Table 2.5).16 Over half of the studies in the literature addressed the issue of economic efficiency 
in some manner. Many studies that address economic efficiency used it to motivate the proposal 
of alternative tariff structures. For example, a number of studies derived Ramsey or Feldstein 
prices (Monteiro and Roseta-Palma 2011; Diakité et al. 2009; Garcia-Valinas 2005; and Renzetti 
1992). Others attempted to derive tariffs that implement marginal cost pricing (e.g., Hall 2009; 
Grafton and Kompas 2007; Briand 2006; Garcia and Reynaud 2004; Kraus et al. 2003; and 
Cueva and Lauria 2001). In addition to using an economic efficiency criterion to motivate the 
design of alternative tariffs, nearly half of the studies identified in the systematic review 
calculated the welfare effects of households in the sample moving from the current tariff to a 
new tariff.17  
Nearly half of the studies identified in the systematic literature review addressed the issue 
of cost recovery, and the majority of these studies addressed cost recovery by imposing it as a 
constraint in the simulation or optimization model, while defining alternative tariff measures 
                                                           
15 See Bonbright (1961), Berg and Tschirhart (1989), and Hanemann (1997) for detailed discussions of objectives 
commonly associated with water pricing and tariff reform.  
16 Additional objectives discussed in this literature include total revenue, subsidy incidence, reservoir storage and 
hydro power generation, and total water use.  
17 Yates et al. (2013) and Rinaudo et al. (2012) do not use economic efficiency to derive alternative tariffs, but do 
examine the welfare effects of different policies.  
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(e.g. Wichelns 2013; Monteiro and Roseta-Palma 2011; Hall 2009; Diakité et al. 2009; and 
Garcia-Valinas 2005; Reynaud 2016; Wolak 2016; Nauges and Whittington 2017). Rosenberg 
(2010) and Cueva and Lauria (2001) explicitly compared the level of cost recovery achieved by 
different tariff alternatives.  
Several authors addressed notions of equity or examined distributional issues in some 
way. The majority of studies addressed notions of equity by examining the distributional impacts 
of alternative tariffs. An exception to this is Barberán and Arbués (2009) who proposed a tariff to 
meet an equity criterion that they proposed. Olmstead and Mansur (2012) compared the welfare 
effects of different demand-side management tools on households with different lot sizes and 
incomes. Ruijs et al. (2008) examined the bill-to-income ratio under different tariffs for 
households in different income quintiles. And Hajispyrou et al. (2002) compared the marginal 
price, average price, and water use among households in different wealth quintiles under 
different tariff structures.  
In addition to economic efficiency, cost recovery, and equity criteria, studies in the 
literature examine a number of other criteria commonly associated with tariff reform. For 
example, five studies in the literature assess tariff performance in terms of a criterion of 
affordability. As discussed in more detail below, the bill-to-income ratio is the most common 
indicator of affordability used in these studies (Ruijs et al. 2008; Cueva and Lauria 2001; 
Reynaud 2016). Nearly a quarter of the studies explicitly examined water conservation. This 
includes Baerenklau et al. (2014) who examined the effectiveness of water budget based tariffs 
in reducing water consumption and Reynaud (2016) who simulated the impact of full cost 
recovery pricing on customer water use in nine European countries. Finally, Wolak (2016) 
examines the use of tariffs derived using household characteristics to improve revenue stability.  
  
53 
Approximately three quarters of the studies in the literature examined two or fewer of the 
criteria discussed above (Table 2.5). Only two studies examined more than three criteria (e.g. 
Cueva and Lauria 2001; Reynaud 2016). This suggests that studies in the literature are typically 
focused on a single criterion, or a small set of criteria associated with tariff setting. Very few 
studies explicitly analyzed the trade-offs between the different criteria they examined. 
 
2.4 Discussion  
 
As noted above, the literature on water and sanitation service pricing is broad and 
relatively fragmented. Nevertheless, there are several common themes that emerge from our 
systematic review of this literature.  Many studies in the literature estimate the demand for 
municipal water services and then use empirical estimates of demand to derive efficient pricing, 
forecast the extent to which different tariffs can be used to achieve water conservation targets, 
and examine the affordability of proposed tariffs. Several studies in the literature also seek to 
identify or address customer heterogeneity in some manner. We discuss each of these themes in 
more detail below.  
 
2.4.1 Efficiency 
 
Over half of the studies identified in the systematic literature review assess the 
performance of tariffs using an economic efficiency criterion. This includes studies that derived 
or examined efficient prices as well as studies that calculated the welfare gains or losses 
associated with alternative tariffs. Studies in the literature that derived efficient prices either 
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examined some form of marginal cost pricing or derived second best prices (e.g., Ramsey or 
Feldstein prices). Studies that examined marginal cost pricing often used an assumption for what 
constitutes marginal cost. For example, Schoengold and Zilberman (2014) assumed that price in 
the upper block of the increasing block tariff used by four utilities in the western United States 
reflects the long-run marginal cost of supply. Grafton and Kompas (2007) used estimates of the 
long-run marginal cost of water supply in Sydney, Australia obtained from the local regulatory 
authority.  
A limited number of studies used empirical estimates of marginal cost in their analysis of 
efficient pricing. For example, Hall (2009) calculated the long-run incremental cost of water 
supply in Los Angeles as an approximation of the long-run marginal cost. He found that the long 
run incremental cost was one and half times the historical average cost of water supply. Only 
Garcia and Reynaud (2004) estimated marginal costs econometrically. They then used this 
estimate to examine the implications of marginal cost pricing.18 In particular, they estimated the 
short-run marginal cost of water supply for utilities in France and found that existing prices were 
relatively close to their estimates of the short-run marginal cost of water supply.  
Several studies that examine efficient pricing derived second best prices using empirical 
estimates of demand. For example, Garcia-Valinas (2005) derived Feldstein prices using 
estimates of the price elasticity of demand for water among residential and non-residential 
customers in Seville, Spain and assumptions about the marginal utility of income. They found 
that Feldstein prices can achieve distributional outcomes without reducing social welfare. Diakité 
                                                           
18 Diakite et al. (2009) use empirical estimates of marginal cost from previous work in their derivation of second 
best prices in Cote d’Ivore.  
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et al. (2009) combined estimates of the price elasticity of demand and a non-linear cost function 
to derive welfare-maximizing prices using a panel of data from 156 communities in Cote 
d’Ivore. In particular, they identified a non-linear optimal price schedule, which they used to 
develop several welfare-improving alternative increasing block tariff structures.  
Studies that derived efficient prices primarily sought to demonstrate that it is possible to 
do so while meeting a utility’s cost recovery objectives. These studies provide insight into 
consumer behavior in particular contexts, add to the body of literature on consumer response to 
price changes, and provide concrete examples of how prices can be set to improve economic 
efficiency. Overall, there appears to be an emerging consensus that, although it is possible to 
derive welfare-improving tariffs, the welfare gains from doing so are relatively modest (Groom 
et al. 2008; Garcia and Reynaud 2004; Diakité et al. 2009; and Nauges and Whittington 2017).  
 
2.4.2 Customer heterogeneity 
 
Several studies in the literature addressed the issue of customer heterogeneity in some 
manner.  The studies that derived Ramsey or Feldstein prices discussed above explicitly 
exploited heterogeneity in customer response to price changes, including differences in how 
residential and non-residential customers respond and customers of different income levels 
respond to price changes. Other studies examined the use of socio-demographic information of 
customers to improve tariff design. For example, using data from two communities in the United 
States, Wolak (2016) combined empirical estimates of demand with household characteristics to 
derive non-linear tariffs to meet utilities’ hypothetical revenue and conservation objectives. He 
found that knowledge of customer-level demographics can be used to design tariffs the reduce 
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revenue uncertainty by 70 to 96 percent.  Using data from the Eastern Municipal Water District 
in California, Baerenklau et al. (2014) examined the impact of introducing a revenue-neutral 
increasing block tariff in which the size of the lifeline block varies for each household based on 
household characteristics (e.g., household size). They estimated that the implementation of such 
a “water budget” increasing block tariff resulted in a 17 percent decrease in water use compared 
to a hypothetical uniform price tariff that generated the same revenue.  
Studies that examine customer heterogeneity provide useful examples of how different 
types of information about customers can be used to improve the design of water tariffs to 
achieve a range of policy objectives (e.g., cost recovery, economic efficiency, revenue stability, 
and conservation). However, water utilities often do not have detailed information on their 
customers. For example, water utilities typically do not have the information necessary to 
implement second-best pricing strategies (i.e., local estimates of the price elasticity of demand 
among different customer classes and the marginal utility of income). In theory, policy makers 
could obtain this information, but it can be expensive to do so and it may not be possible to 
estimate these parameters for a particular service population in a credible manner. Similarly, it 
may be difficult or impossible for utilities to obtain and maintain accurate information on 
household characteristics necessary to implement “water budget rates” discussed in Baerenklau 
et al. (2014). Recognizing that it may be difficult for utilities to obtain accurate information on 
customers, several studies discussed, or explicitly examined, menu tariffs as an incentive 
compatible way to help utilities overcome information asymmetry (e.g., Barberán and Arbués 
2009; Krause et al. 2003; Elnaboulsi 2001).  
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2.4.3 Affordability  
 
Several studies in the literature examine the issue of affordability. Affordability is often 
measured as the ratio of a household’s expenditure on water and their income. The extent to 
which water service is affordable is, of course, subjective. However, studies in the literature 
typically use an oft-cited rule of thumb that water service is affordable if households spend less 
than three to five percent of their income on water (OECD 2010).  
Using household data from Dakar, Senegal Cueva and Lauria (2001) find that household 
expenditure on water for households with a connection to the piped water network is 
approximately 4% of households’ monthly income. Using aggregate data from 39 municipalities 
that constitute the Metropolitan Region of Sao Paola, Brazil, Ruijs et al. (2008) find that under 
the current tariff households spend between 0.5% and 5% of their income on piped water service. 
In contrast to Cueva and Lauria (2001) and Ruijs et al. (2008) who examine the affordability of 
existing tariffs, Reynaud (2016) estimates demand for water using data from nine European 
countries to examine the impact of full cost recovery pricing. They find that, with the exception 
of Bulgaria, households in the first income decile would spend less than three percent of their 
income19 on piped water service at the authors’ estimates of full cost recovery pricing.  
Departing from other studies in the literature, Garcia-Valinas (2010) argues that the 
commonly used measure of affordability, households’ total expenditure on water, is flawed. In 
particular, They argue that only the fraction of households’ water use necessary to meet basic 
needs should be considered when examining the affordability of water services. Using data from 
approximately 300 municipalities in southern Spain, Garcia-Valinas (2010) estimates a Stone-
                                                           
19 Reynaud (2016) uses “equalized disposable income” as an income proxy, which he defines as, “the total income 
of a household after tax and other deductions that is available to for spending or saving” (74).  
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Geary demand function for water service to identify the proportion of water use that is 
insensitive to changes in price. They then calculate how much households would pay for this 
quantity of water under existing tariffs and finds that this minimum level of water use would cost 
between 0.20 percent and 3 percent of average monthly income.20 This level of expenditure was 
far lower than if households’ total water use was used to estimate affordability.  
Although a number of studies in the literature examine affordability, there does not 
appear to be a clear or consistent way of calculating the bill-to-income ratio that is used against 
the three-to-five percent rule of thumb referred to in the literature. For example, it is not clear 
whether the bill-to-income ratio includes only how much households pay for water service from 
a utility or whether it includes households’ total expenditure on water, which may include the 
cost of bottled water or supplemental supply from water vendors. It is also not clear whether this 
threshold for affordability includes how much households spend on sanitation services. 
 
2.4.4 Conservation  
 
Water conservation is reflected in economists’ definition of economic efficiency.  
Nevertheless, utility professionals and policy makers often express interest in promoting 
conservation in its own right as a means to address existing supply constraints or avoid the need 
to increase water supply. Several studies in the literature examined the extent to which different 
tariffs affected customers’ water use. As discussed above, Baerenklau et al. (2014) find that the 
“water budget” increasing block rate implemented in the Eastern Municipal Water District in 
                                                           
20 Garcia-Valinas (2010) indicates that more refined data on the income distribution in the municipalities included in 
her study were not available.  
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California resulted in 17 percent decrease in aggregate water use relative to a hypothetical 
counterfactual uniform price tariff that generates the same amount of revenue. Using data on 
household characteristics, Wolak (2016) computed price schedules that reduce aggregate water 
use by 25 percent while generating at least as much revenue as the existing tariffs. Using 
aggregate data from 300 municipalities in Southern France, Rinaudo et al. (2012) estimated that 
a 50 percent increase in the marginal price for water would result in nearly 3 million cubic 
meters of water savings, which they indicated is enough to postpone water supply expansion by 
six years.21 They estimated that the majority of water savings (and welfare losses associated with 
the price increases) is a result of reduced water use among households with gardens. Finally, 
Mansur and Olmstead (2012) estimated the welfare implications of using water use restrictions 
in response to drought several utilities in the western United States. They argued that replacing 
rationing with drought pricing would generate welfare gains equal to approximately 30% of what 
households in their sample spend on water in each year.  
 
2.5 Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper presented the results of a systematic review the literature on the performance 
of tariffs for water and sanitation services. Papers identified through our systematic review are 
published in a wide range of journals and vary considerably with respect to studies’ core aims, 
methods, number of tariffs examined, and the indicators of tariff performance examined. 
Reflecting this heterogeneity, the studies identified in the systematic review often do not speak 
                                                           
21 As noted by the authors, this projection needs to be interpreted with caution because the price elasticity of 
demand describes how customers respond to marginal (e.g., small) changes in price.  
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directly to, or build upon, one another to contribute to a cohesive body of knowledge that can 
directly inform water pricing and tariff reform efforts. This is not surprising given the individual 
aims of studies in the literature, but highlights an important opportunity given the potential role 
of tariffs in financing the infrastructure transition facing both developing and industrialized 
countries alike. Additionally, the empirical literature is largely silent on the public or political 
acceptability of different tariff alternatives. This is understandable for studies that examine 
variants of existing tariffs, but requires additional attention for tariffs that represent significant 
departures from current pricing practices, particularly if the literature seeks to inform policy. 
Our review of the literature highlights a number of other promising areas for research. As 
discussed above, many studies examine customer heterogeneity in some manner. This includes 
studies that examine customer heterogeneity along a single dimension (e.g., residential vs. non-
residential customers, income, etc.) as well as studies that seek to use more detailed socio-
demographic data to improve the design of water and sanitation tariffs. Utilities often do not 
have the information required to implement second-best pricing or implement “water budget” 
rates described in Baerenklau et al. (2014) and it may be expensive or not possible for utilities to 
obtain and update this information on a regular basis. However, this may not be true in well-
resourced contexts and may change with advances in big data and e-governance. As a result, 
there is an opportunity for additional research on customer heterogeneity and, in particular, 
heterogeneity in customer demand. Even if utilities cannot use this information directly in the 
tariff design process, additional insight into customer heterogeneity can inform infrastructure 
planning as well as the potential distributional impacts of tariff reform.  
In addition to research that provides insight into heterogeneity in the demand for 
municipal water and sanitation services, we know relatively little about the extent to which 
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customers respond to average price, marginal price, or some other price signal. With the 
exception of Nauges and Whittington (2017), studies in the literature often do not explicitly state 
whether they assume customers respond to average or marginal price.  This assumption is 
important because it has implications for both forecasting customer response to price changes 
under alternative tariffs as well as the welfare implications associated with them. Several studies 
in the broader literature on the demand for municipal water services seek to identify whether 
customers respond to average, marginal, or some other price in a given context (Ito 2013; Nataraj 
and Hanemann 2011). However, there is not general consensus on whether customers respond to 
average or marginal price. Customer responses are also likely to be heterogeneous, context 
specific, and non-stationary. The extent to which customers respond to average or marginal price 
may vary with a range of factors, including the type of tariff, level of prices, salience of prices, 
and frequency of billing. Additional insight into this aspect of customer behavior will be useful 
for understanding the potential implications of implementing alternative tariffs in different 
contexts.  
We also know relatively little about how customers respond to large price increases. 
Several studies examined forecast aggregate water use under different hypothetical tariffs using 
estimates of the price elasticity of demand. However, the price elasticity of demand describes 
how customers respond to marginal changes in price and may not be appropriate to predict 
customers’ response to large price increases. Currently, the tariffs implemented by many utilities 
that provide water and sanitation services price do not generate sufficient revenue to cover the 
full cost of providing these services to their customers. According to the International Monetary 
Fund, tariffs that are not sufficient to cover the cost of service delivery resulted in nearly 500 
billion dollars of implicit subsidies globally in 2012 (Kochar et al. 2015). If tariffs are to play a 
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meaningful role in financing the water and sanitation infrastructure transition, utilities will need 
to move towards full cost recovery pricing. Understanding how customers respond to large price 
increases in both the short-run and long-run – including the extent to which price increases 
influence customers – decisions about whether to connect to, or disconnect from, piped water 
and sanitation networks – will help utilities better forecast future revenue and infrastructure 
needs.  
The Sustainable Development Goals for water and sanitation explicitly call for universal 
access to safe and affordable water and sanitation services. Most studies in the literature measure 
affordability using the ratio of a households’ water bill to their income and then apply the 
widely-cited rule of thumb that service is affordable if is below three to five percent of a 
households’ income. This notion of affordability lacks an empirical basis, does not take into 
account household preferences, and ignores the reality that households without access to piped 
water and sanitation services often pay more for these services than those connected to the 
network. Additionally, there is currently a lack of clarity about whether the numerator in the bill-
to-income ratio includes both water and sanitation services or reflects the fact that households 
often use multiple sources. Similarly, there is a lack of clarity on whether the “correct” 
denominator of the bill-to-income ratio is total expenditure or income. Assuming affordability 
will continue to play in important role in global dialogue about water and sanitation service 
delivery, there is a need for more focused attention to developing an empirically-informed 
definition of affordability and a consistent means of measuring it.  
Finally, our systematic review indicates that the vast majority of studies in the literature 
examine the pricing of water and sanitation services in industrialized countries. This likely 
reflects the fact that data are more readily available from utilities in these countries. However, it 
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highlights a clear opportunity for additional research on the pricing of water and sanitation 
services in low- and middle-income countries. Urban and peri-urban areas are growing rapidly in 
these countries and governments are struggling to provide high-quality water and sanitation 
services to an increasingly urban population. This presents an important and dynamic context for 
future research on pricing water and sanitation services.   
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Search Engine 
No. of 
References 
Web of Science 338 
SCOPUS 440 
Academic Search 
Complete 180 
Business Search Complete 214 
Total  1172 
Non-duplicate 939 
 
Table 2.1. Summary of Boolean search results from four academic search engines. 
 
 
 
Keywords 
No. of 
References 
Price elasticity of demand 93 
Simulation 18 
Tariff comparison 30 
Misc. 46 
Demand forecasting 16 
Demand-side management 19 
Welfare 8 
 
Table 2.2. Summary of keywords assigned after abstract review. 
 (Note: Papers were assigned more than one keyword when applicable.) 
  
  
   
Study Journal Water Economics 
Policy & 
Development Other 
Nauges and Whittington (2017) World Development   X  
Wolak (2016) n.a.    Working paper 
Reynaud (2016) Water Resources and Economics X    
Whittington et al. (2015) Utilities Policy   X  
Schoengold and Zilberman (2014) Water Resources and Economics X    
Renzetti et al. (2014) Utilities Policy   X  
Baerenklau et al. (2014) Land Economics  X   
Hoffman and du Plessis (2013) Water Sa X    
Wichelns (2013) International Journal of Water Resources Development X    
Yates et al. (2013) Water Policy X    
Rinaudo et al. (2012) Water Resources Management X    
Olmstead and Mansur (2012) Journal of Urban Economics  X   
Monteiro and Roseta-Palma (2011) Water Resources Research X    
Di Cosmo (2011) Water Resources Management X    
Garcia-Valinas et al. (2010) Journal of Environmental Management   X  
Rosenburg (2010) Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management X    
Ahmad and Prashar (2010) Water Resources Management X    
Hall (2009) Contemporary Economic Policy  X   
Diakite et al. (2009) Journal of Development Economics  X   
Barberan and Arbues (2009) Water Resources Management X    
Cheesman et al. (2008) Water Resources Research X    
Ruijs et al. (2008) Ecological Economics  X   
Groom et al. (2008) n.a.    Book chapter 
Grafton and Kompas (2007) Utilities Policy   X  
Briand (2006) n.a.    Working paper 
Garcia-Valinas (2005) Environmental Resource Economics  X   
Garcia and Reynaud (2004) Resource and Energy Economics  X   
Krause et al. (2003) Journal of Regulatory Economics  X   
Hajispyrou et al. (2002) Environment and Development Economics  X   
Saleth and Dinar (2001) Water Resources Research X    
Elnaboulsi (2001) Water Resources Management X    
Cueva and Lauria (2001) n.a.    Book chapter 
Kim (1995) Review of Industrial Organization  X   
Renzetti (1992) Utilities Policy     X   
Table 2.3. Publication outlets and types of journals for studies identified in the systematic review.
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Study 
Primary focus on 
tariff simulation? Country Region Service 
Nauges and Whittington (2017) Yes Hypothetical n.a. water  
Wolak (2016) No United States North America water 
Reynaud (2016) No 9 European countries Europe and Central Asia water 
Whittington et al. (2015) Yes Hypothetical n.a. water & wastewater 
Schoengold and Zilberman (2014) Yes United States North America water 
Renzetti et al. (2014) Yes Canada North America water 
Baerenklau et al. (2014) No United States North America water 
Hoffman and du Plessis (2013) No Hypothetical n.a. water 
Wichelns (2013) Yes Hypothetical n.a. water 
Yates et al. (2013) No United States North America water 
Rinaudo et al. (2012) Yes France Europe and Central Asia water 
Olmstead and Mansur (2012) No United States North America water 
Monteiro and Roseta-Palma (2011) No Portugal Europe and Central Asia water & wastewater 
Di Cosmo (2011) No Italy Europe and Central Asia water 
Garcia-Valinas et al. (2010) No Spain Europe and Central Asia water & wastewater 
Rosenburg (2010) Yes Jordan Middle East and North Africa water 
Ahmad and Prashar (2010) No United States North America water 
Hall (2009) No United States North America water 
Diakite et al. (2009) No Cote d'Ivore Sub-Saharan Africa not stated 
Barberan and Arbues (2009) No Spain Europe and Central Asia water 
Cheesman et al. (2008) No Vietnam East Asia Pacific water 
Ruijs et al. (2008) No Brazil Latin American & Caribbean water 
Groom et al. (2008) Yes China East Asia Pacific water 
Grafton and Kompas (2007) No Australia East Asia Pacific water 
Briand (2006) Yes Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa water 
Garcia-Valinas (2006) No Spain Europe and Central Asia water 
Garcia and Reynaud (2004) No France Europe and Central Asia water 
Krause et al. (2003) No United States North America water 
Hajispyrou et al. (2002) No Cyprus Europe and Central Asia water 
Saleth and Dinar (2001) No India South Asia water 
Elnaboulsi (2001) No Hypothetical n.a. water & wastewater 
Cueva and Lauria (2001) Yes  Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa water 
Kim (1995) No United States North America water 
Renzetti (1992) Yes Canada North America water 
Table 2.4. Summary of basic information from studies identified in the systematic literature review.  
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Study Efficiency Equity 
Cost 
Recovery Affordability 
Revenue 
stability Conservation Other 
Nauges and Whittington (2017) X X X      
Wolak (2016)   X  X   
Reynaud (2016) X  X X  X  
Whittington et al. (2015)  X      
Schoengold and Zilberman (2014) X X X     
Renzetti et al. (2014)  X      
Baerenklau et al. (2014)   X   X  
Hoffman and du Plessis (2013)      X  
Wichelns (2013)   X     
Yates et al. (2013)       reservoir storage 
Rinaudo et al. (2012)      X total revenue 
Olmstead and Mansur (2012) X X    X  
Monteiro and Roseta-Palma (2011) X   X     
Di Cosmo (2011)      X  
Garcia-Valinas et al. (2010)    X    
Rosenburg (2010)  X X     
Ahmad and Prashar (2010)      X  
Hall (2009) X  X     
Diakite et al. (2009) X X X     
Barberan and Arbues (2009)  X  X    
Cheesman et al. (2008)      X total revenue 
Ruijs et al. (2008)  X  X    
Groom et al. (2008)  X X     
Grafton and Kompas (2007) X       
Briand (2006) X       
Garcia-Valinas (2005) X X X     
Garcia and Reynaud (2004) X       
Krause et al. (2003) X  X     
Hajispyrou et al. (2002) X X      
Saleth and Dinar (2001)  X      
Elnaboulsi (2001) X  X     
Cueva and Lauria (2001) X X X X    
Kim (1995)  X       
Renzetti (1992) X   X         
Table 2.5. Summary of policy objectives examined in studies identified in the systematic literature review.
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Figure 2.1. Schematic of the systematic literature review process. 
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Figure 2.2. Annual distribution of publications identified in the systematic review. 
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CHAPTER 3: ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF ALTERNATIVE WATER AND 
SANITATION TARIFFS: THE CASE OF NAIROBI, KENYA. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Policy makers and utility managers can use a variety of tariff structures to calculate 
customers’ bills for water and sanitation services, ranging from a simple fixed monthly fee to 
complicated multipart tariffs with seasonal pricing based on metered water use. Faced with such 
a wide range of options, what tariff should policy makers use? Further, once they have decided 
on a particular tariff structure, how should they set water prices? Economists and development 
practitioners have debated these questions for decades. However, the issue of pricing municipal 
water and sanitation services has renewed significance given the aspiration of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) to ensure universal access to safely managed water and sanitation 
services as well as the challenges posed by climate change. Indeed, tariff reform in many 
developing countries will play a central role in determining whether or not utilities are able to 
generate the revenue and acquire the financing necessary to achieve universal access to resilient 
water and sanitation services.   
In this paper, we develop a framework for simulating the performance of water and 
sanitation tariffs with respect to several policy-relevant criteria. We then apply this framework to 
the case of Nairobi, Kenya, a rapidly growing city with conditions similar to that of many large 
cities in low- and middle-income countries. In particular, we examine the performance of five 
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alternative tariff structures relative to the current tariff implemented by Nairobi City Water and 
Sewer Company (NCWSC) at three different levels of cost recovery. We then evaluate the 
performance of alternative tariffs relative to several criteria associated with tariff performance, 
including: the overall quantity of water sold (i.e., conservation), the magnitude of the total 
subsidy delivered through the tariff, subsidy incidence, and changes in social welfare.  
Our analysis extends the literature on tariff performance in several ways. First, the 
majority of studies in the literature focus on industrialized countries and examine one or two 
indicators of tariff performance. To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the 
performance of water and sanitation tariffs relative to a broad portfolio of policy-relevant criteria 
in a low- or middle-income country context. Second, we explicitly compare the performance of a 
suite of IBTs to tariffs that implement a uniform volumetric price. Finally, in contrast to many 
studies in the literature, we simulate the performance of tariff alternatives over a 5-year planning 
horizon and consider the performance of tariffs under uncertainty about consumer behavior.  
Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that tariff alternatives with a uniform 
volumetric price perform equally well or better than IBT tariff alternatives at the three levels of 
cost recovery we consider.  This includes both a two-part tariff long promoted by economists 
(i.e., a uniform price with rebate) as well as a simple tariff in which customers face a uniform 
volumetric price. These findings are robust to assumptions about whether customers respond to 
average or marginal price. Overall, our findings add to a growing body of evidence that 
challenges commonly held perceptions about IBTs and suggest that considerable gains can be 
realized by getting utilities on a path to improved cost recovery.  
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3.2 Background and Literature 
 
A water tariff is a set of rules by which a utility calculates how much customers need to 
pay on a regular basis (e.g., monthly, bi-monthly, etc.) in exchange for a specified level of 
service. Informed by this broad definition, there is a wide variety of tariff structures that can be 
used to charge customers for water and sanitation services. Tariffs that policy makers can use to 
calculate the volumetric portion of customers’ water and wastewater bills include increasing 
block tariffs (IBTs), decreasing block tariffs, and uniform price tariffs. Despite the diversity of 
tariff structures at policy makers’ disposal, the IBT is the most widely implemented tariff among 
water utilities in low and middle-income countries (GWI 2013). The IBT has widespread appeal 
due to the perception that it can be used to simultaneously subsidize water use for low-income 
households and recover costs and promote conservation among high-income customers 
(Whittington et al. 2015; Fuente et al. 2016).  
The popularity of the IBT reflects the fact that policy makers often try to use the tariff to 
achieve, and balance, a wide range of policy objectives. Bonbright (1961) presented an early 
articulation of eight core objectives of tariff setting: simplicity and public acceptability, freedom 
from controversy, revenue stability, revenue sufficiency, rate (price) stability, fairness in 
apportionment of costs, avoidance of undue rate discrimination, and encouragement of 
efficiency.22 The task of setting water tariffs might be relatively easy if these objectives were 
mutually reinforcing. However, many objectives associated with tariff design often conflict with 
one another. For example, the objectives of full cost recovery and affordability are often believed 
                                                           
22 See Berg and Tschirhart (1989), Hanemann (1997), and Whittington (2011) for detailed overviews of the various 
objectives of tariff setting. 
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to be contradictory and economic efficiency can also be at odds with cost recovery and revenue 
stability.   
Overall, the empirical literature on the performance of water and sanitation tariffs is 
relatively thin, fragmented, and dominated by studies that examine tariff performance in 
industrialized countries. The two most well-developed threads in the literature include studies 
that estimate the price elasticity of demand or examine how well tariffs target subsidies to low-
income households. The former category of studies estimate the price – and sometimes the 
income – elasticity of demand to derive second-best prices23 to improve economic efficiency 
(e.g., Renzetti 1992b; Garcia-Valinas 2005; Diakite et al. 2009; Garcia-Valinas 2010; Rinaudo et 
al. 2012; Reynaud 2016). These studies provide insight into customer behavior and offer 
concrete examples of how prices can be set to improve economic efficiency subject to a cost 
recovery constraint. However, these studies have two principle limitations with respect to the 
design of water and sanitation tariffs. First, economic efficiency is one of several criteria policy 
makers may consider when setting water tariffs and tariffs that improve economic efficiency may 
perform poorly with respect to other criteria. Second, policy makers typically do not have the 
information necessary to implement second-best pricing strategies (i.e., local estimates of the 
price elasticity of demand among different customer classes). Policy makers could of course 
                                                           
23 Examples of second best prices include Ramsey-Boiteux and Feldstein pricing.  The basic aim of Ramsey-
Boiteux pricing is to minimize the welfare losses associated with deviations from marginal cost pricing. To 
accomplish this, Ramsey-Boiteux pricing applies the inverse elasticity rule, in which customers who are less 
sensitive to price changes face higher marginal prices than those that are more sensitive to price changes. A common 
critique of Ramsey-Boiteux pricing is that it may be regressive if low-income customers are less sensitive to price 
changes than high-income customers. To address this, Feldstein (1972) proposed a pricing strategy that effectively 
weights the Ramsey-Boiteux price by the marginal utility of income, which is assumed to be decreasing in income.   
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obtain this information, but it can be expensive to do so and it may not be possible to estimate 
these parameters in a credible manner econometrically.  
The second well-developed thread in the literature examines the extent to which IBTs 
target subsidies to low-income households. Researchers have long questioned the extent to which 
IBTs effectively target subsidies to low-income households in low- and middle-income countries 
(e.g., Whittington 1992). Two decades of research using a range of data sources and methods 
across several countries has largely confirmed that IBTs do not effectively target subsidies to 
low-income households (Whittington et al. 2015; Fuente et al. 2016). However, like economic 
efficiency, subsidy targeting is one of several factors policy makers consider when setting water 
tariffs.  
Overall, it is difficult to distill general insight from studies in the literature on the 
performance of water and sanitation tariffs. Studies in the literature often lack a common 
approach to simulating tariff performance, do not employ a common set of indicators of tariff 
performance, and typically simulate a small set of tariff alternatives. Many studies also focus on 
one or two dimensions of tariff performance. While studies in the literature provide insight into 
how a set of tariffs performs with respect to a particular objective, they often do not evaluate 
tariff performance relative to a portfolio of indicators.  
A recent exception to this is Nauges and Whittington (2017), who use hypothetical data 
on residential customer water use to simulate the performance of nine alternative tariffs. In 
particular, they simulate a transition from a uniform price tariff to an IBT and examine how 
different IBT alternatives perform with respect to subsidy incidence and economic efficiency at 
two levels of cost recovery. Consistent with other studies in the literature, they find that the tariff 
alternatives they simulate do not effectively target subsidies to low-income customers at low 
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levels of cost recovery and that subsidy targeting is worse when the correlation between income 
and water use is high. Additionally, they find that the efficiency losses associated with a shift 
from a uniform price tariff to an IBT are relatively small, particularly when customers respond to 
average, rather than marginal, price.  
This paper seeks to make several contributions to the literature on tariff design. In 
particular, we extend previous work by Whittington et al. (2015) and Fuente et al. (2016) by 
expanding the scope of our analysis beyond subsidy incidence. This paper also extends the recent 
work of Nauges and Whittington (2017) in several ways. First, we simulate tariff performance 
using a complete set of billing records from a utility in a non-industrialized country. Thus, in 
addition to being one of a few studies in the literature to examine the performance of tariffs in a 
low or middle-income country context, our simulations include both residential and non-
residential customers. Second, we examine a broader range of indicators of tariff performance 
than other studies in the literature. In particular, we expand the criteria of tariff performance to 
include conservation and the trade-off between improving cost recovery (i.e., the magnitude of 
the subsidy delivered through the tariff) and the welfare effects of associated with different 
tariffs.   
 
3.3 Empirical Strategy 
 
To assess the relative performance of alternative tariff structures in Nairobi, we develop a 
simulation model to forecast changes in customer water use, the utility’s revenue, and the cost of 
providing water and wastewater services. We use this simulation model to examine the 
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performance of five tariff alternatives relative to several policy-relevant criteria at three different 
levels of cost recovery. The simulation model runs in annual time steps over a 5-year planning 
horizon, an interval at which tariff reviews are often conducted by regulators and over which a 
utility might seek to achieve full cost recovery. We then measure the performance of alternative 
tariff structures relative to a dynamic baseline – i.e., forecasts of the status quo tariff over the 
same planning horizon.  
 
3.3.1 Description of tariff simulation model 
 
The total quantity of water used by customers and the total quantity of wastewater 
produced is determined by several factors, including but not limited to: the size of the service 
population, the composition of the service population (i.e., fraction of customers with water 
service only and water and wastewater service), the tariff, climatic conditions, the wealth and 
other attributes of the service population, and service substitutes (e.g., private wells, water 
vendors, septic tanks). Our simulation model forecasts customer water use as a function of the 
water use in the prior period, customers’ price elasticity of demand, the change in price 
customers face, customers’ income elasticity of demand, and the change in income (Equation 
3.1).  
 
 𝑊𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑊𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ [1 + (𝛽𝑗,𝑡 ∗ ∆𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑌 ∗ ∆𝑌𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑗,𝑅)] (3.1) 
                                        
Where…. 
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• WUSEj,t is the average monthly water use for a customer j in year t;  
• WUSEj,t-1 is the average monthly water use for customer j in year t-1;  
• 𝛽𝑗,𝑡 is the price elasticity of demand for customer j in year t; 
• ∆𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1is the percent change in price from year t-1 to t-2 for customer j; 
• ɛ Y is the income elasticity of demand for residential customers;  
• ΔIt is the percent change in income from year t-1 to t; and  
•  𝐼𝑅  is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if customer j is a residential customer 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
In our base case scenario, we assume that that the income elasticity of demand for 
residential customers is +0.1 and that the annual change in income for residential customers is 
equal to 5%. (See Appendix 3-1 for a summary of parameter values used in our base case 
simulations.)  
Economic theory assumes that consumers are well informed about the price schedules 
they face and that they respond to marginal prices. However, in the face of complex price 
schedules, consumers may not be well informed about the marginal price they face.24 Additional 
factors that may influence whether customers respond to marginal price, average price, or some 
other price signal (e.g., an increase in the bill, expected marginal or average price, etc.) include: 
                                                           
24 Since the issue was raised by Howe and Linaweaver (1967) and later discussed by Taylor (1975) and Nordin 
(1976), the extent to which customers respond to average or marginal price has been widely explored in the applied 
economics literature, particularly in the context income tax (e.g., Saez 1999, Saez 2003, Saez 2010, Chetty et al. 
2011), electricity tariffs (e.g., Ito 2014 and Borenstein 2009), and to a lesser extent water tariffs (e.g., Foster and 
Beatie 1981, Ruijs et al. 2008, Nataraj and Hanemann 2011, Binet et al. 2013, and Ito 2013). To our knowledge, 
only Binet et al. (2013) has explored whether water utility customers respond to average or marginal price in a 
developing country context and found that customers’ response indicated that customers underestimated both 
average and marginal price.   
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the salience of customers’ water bills, individual customer characteristics, water use, billing 
frequency, and payment method (e.g., automatic withdrawal, payment center, mobile money). 
Field work conducted for Fuente at al. (2016) suggested that customers in Nairobi were not well 
informed about the tariff they faced. Thus, we assume that customers respond to changes in 
average, rather than marginal, price in our base case simulations. 
Because we do not have estimates of the price elasticity of demand for piped water 
services in Nairobi, we use estimates of the price elasticity of demand from the literature. In our 
base case, we assume that residential customers that use above 5 m3/mo. have a price elasticity 
of demand of -0.2 (Arbues et al. 2003; Dalhuisen et al. 2003; Espey et al. 2007; Nauges and 
Whittington 2010). We also assume that residential customers who use less than 5 m3/mo. are 
insensitive to price changes.25 Because customers are unlikely to immediately adjust their water 
use in response to changes in price, we assume that residential customers respond to a one-year 
lagged change in price. 
The literature on the demand for water among non-residential customers (e.g., 
commercial, industrial, and bulk customers) is quite thin, but suggests that non-residential 
customers are typically more responsive to price changes than residential customers (Renzetti 
1992a; Renzetti 1992b; Reynaud 2003; Garcia and Reynaud 2004; Worthington 2010). However, 
in our simulations we assume that non-residential customers in Nairobi are insensitive to price 
changes. As discussed in more detail below, we make this assumption to allow us to estimate the 
economic impact of price changes on non-residential customers. While believe this assumption is 
                                                           
25 This is supported by empirical studies in the literature that use a Stone-Geary demand function to estimate what 
portion of water use is insensitive to price control (Madhoo 2009; Martinez-Espineira and Nauges 2004; Nauges et 
al. 2009). 
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plausible in Nairobi given the low prices of water in Nairobi and the relatively short duration of 
our simulation period, it may result in our simulations overestimating the total amount of water 
used by non-residential customers.  
We calculate customers’ average monthly bill as a function of their water use and the 
tariff alternative simulated. The utility’s average monthly revenue is the sum of all customers’ 
bills multiplied by the utility’s collection efficiency – i.e., the percent of total billings the utility 
collects as revenue. The total amount of water the utility must produce and the total quantity of 
wastewater it must treat in each year of the simulation is a function of customer water use and 
the fraction of customers with a wastewater connection (Equations 3.2 and 3.3). The amount of 
water the utility must produce in each year of the simulation is also a function of the level of 
non-revenue water26, which may vary over time.   
 
 
𝑄𝑤,𝑡 = [∑(𝑊𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑗,𝑡)
𝑁𝑡
𝑗=1
] (1 − 𝑁𝑅𝑊𝑡)⁄  (3.2) 
Where…  
• Qw,t is the average amount of water that must be produced by the utility in year t;  
• Nt is the total number of customers in year t;  
• WUSEj,t is the average monthly water use for customer j in year t (Equation 3.1); and  
• NRWt is the level of non-revenue water in year t.  
                                                           
26 We define non-revenue water as the volume of water produced by the utility minus the amount of water billed to 
customers divided by the volume of water produced by the utility. 
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𝑄𝑤𝑤,𝑡 = [∑(𝑊𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑗,𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑗 )
𝑁𝑡
𝑗=1
] (3.3) 
Where…  
• Qww,t is the average amount of water that must be treated by the utility in year t;  
• Nt is the total number of customers in year t;  
• WUSEj,t is the average monthly water use for customer j at time t (Equation 3.1); and 
• Iwwj, is dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if customer j has a wastewater 
connection and 0 if they do not.  
 
As indicated in Equations 3.2 and 3.3, the simulation model accommodates annual 
changes in the size of the customer base (Nt). In our base case, we assume that the customer base 
increases 5% per year and that the relative composition of the customer base remains constant 
throughout the five-year planning period (e.g., the proportion of residential and non-residential 
customers remains constant as well as the proportion of customers who receive wastewater 
service).  
A water utility needs financial resources to pay for three broad categories of costs: 
routine operations and maintenance costs (O&M costs), the repair and replacement of the 
existing capital stock, and the expansion of the water and wastewater network to meet increased 
demand for these services (expansion costs). Privately owned utilities also need revenue to pay 
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dividends or retained profits. We assume that full cost recovery tariffs are tariffs that would 
allow the utility to raise sufficient revenue to cover O&M and capital costs without subsidies or 
without running down the capital stock. Based on our previous work, we assume that the full cost 
of water service and wastewater service in Nairobi is 0.94 USD/m3 and 0.98 USD/m3, 
respectively (Fuente et al. 2016). We also assume that the utility operates at constant returns to 
scale.  
 
3.3.2 Performance criteria 
 
We evaluate the performance of alternative tariffs relative to five criteria: aggregate water 
use (i.e., conservation), the magnitude of the total subsidy delivery through the tariff, subsidy 
incidence, change in customer welfare, and change in social welfare (e.g., the deadweight loss to 
society). We have selected these criteria because they represent issues about which various 
stakeholders (policy makers, utility managers, economists, etc.) often express concern.27  
We define aggregate water use under each tariff alternative as the total amount of water sold to 
customers. We compare aggregate water use under each tariff alternative at the end of the five-
year planning relative to a dynamic baseline of forecasts of aggregate water use under the current 
tariff at the end of the five-year planning period at status quo levels of cost recovery.  
We define the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through the tariff as the difference 
between the utility’s revenue and the cost of providing services. We calculate the subsidies 
delivered through the tariff alternatives each year and report the net present value of the stream 
                                                           
27 These are positive indicators of tariff performance and we do not ex-ante assign a normative weighting to them. 
  
86 
 
of subsidies over the five-year simulation period.28 We also examine the distributional incidence 
of subsidies delivered through the tariff, which we define as the share of total subsidies delivered 
to low-income residential customers (Equation 3.4).  
 
𝑆𝑡 =
∑ ((𝑊𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑗,𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑗,𝑡) ∙ 𝐿𝑗)
𝑁𝑡
𝑗=1
𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑡
 (3.4) 
Where: 
• St is the share of subsidies delivered to residential customers in low-income areas in year 
t; 
• SUBt is the average monthly subsidies delivered through the tariff in year t; 
• Nt is the total number of customers at time t;  
• WUSEj,t is the average monthly water use for customer j in year t (Equation 3.1); 
• COSTj,t is the average cost of serving customer j in year t; 
• BILLj,t is the average monthly bill for residential customer j in year t; and 
• Lj is dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if customer j is a low-income residential 
customer and 0 otherwise. 
 
NCWSC sells water to both residential and non-residential customers. We approximate 
the change in welfare for residential customers by calculating the change in consumer surplus 
that accompanies the transition to a new tariff. In particular, we calculate the change in consumer 
                                                           
28 All net present value calculations use a real discount rate of 10%.  
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surplus for each customer using Equation 3.5 and sum over the customer base to obtain the 
aggregate change in consumer surplus for each period in the simulation (Nauges and Whittington 
2017).  
 
∆𝐶𝑆𝑗,𝑡
𝑇 = − (
𝑄𝑗,𝑡
𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝛽𝑗,𝑡(1 + 𝛽𝑗,𝑡)
) (𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑇 (1+𝛽𝑗.𝑡) − 𝑃𝑗,𝑡
(1+𝛽𝑗.𝑡)) (3.5) 
 
Where:  
• ∆𝐶𝑆𝑗,𝑡
𝑇  is the change in consumer surplus for residential customer j under tariff alternative 
T in year t;  
• 𝑄𝑗,𝑡 is the quantity of water customer j would use under the status quo tariff in year t;  
• Pj,t is the price29 faced by customer j at time t under the status quo tariff in year t;  
• 𝛽𝑗,𝑡 is the price elasticity of demand for customer j in year t; and 
• 𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑇  is the price faced by customer j under tariff alternative T in year t. 
 
The water use of non-residential customers reflects a producers’ demand for an input 
(Renzetti 1992a; Reynaud 2003). We assume that non-residential customers are producers that 
select their use of inputs, including water, to minimize the cost of producing a certain level of 
output. We do not have information on non-residential customers’ use of other inputs or their 
                                                           
29 This is either the average or marginal price facing the customer depending on whether the model assumes 
customers respond to changes in average or marginal prices.  
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underlying production functions. Thus, we assume that their water demands are separable from 
other input demands (Renzetti 1992b; Garcia and Reynaud 2004)30 and estimate welfare effects 
of price changes on non-residential customers as the change in their profits. Relying on our 
assumption that non-residential customers are insensitive to price changes, we approximate the 
change in profits for non-residential customers as the difference between the water bills they face 
under the status quo tariff and the different tariff alternatives we consider.31  
As noted by Renzetti (1992b), a change in the water tariff can affect residential customers 
through two distinct channels. A change in tariff will affect residential customers directly 
through the price they face for water and sanitation services. We approximate this effect by the 
change in consumer surplus as described above. A change in tariff may also affect residential 
customers indirectly via the impact of price changes on non-residential customers’ outputs. This 
effect is not included in our estimates of the change in customer welfare.32 
In our base case, we assume that customers respond to changes in average, rather than 
marginal, price. As noted by Nauges and Whittington (2017), if customers respond to changes in 
marginal price, Equation 3.5 will not accurately measure the change in consumer surplus under 
IBTs. Appendix 3-2 discusses this in more detail and describes how we calculate changes in 
consumer surplus when we assume that customers respond to marginal price.  
                                                           
30 We do not have data to confirm whether this assumption holds in Nairobi. However, both Renzetti (1992b) and 
Garcia and Reynaud (2004) cite examples that suggest this assumption may be reasonable in some industrialized 
countries.  
31 We acknowledge that this is necessarily rough approximation of the impact of prices changes on non-residential 
customers. However, additional information on the structure of firms’ production functions would be required to 
develop more accurate estimates of the impact of price changes on non-residential customers.  
32 The indirect effect of the change in prices for non-residential customers on residential customers will be reflected 
in our estimates of the change in welfare if the following two conditions hold: 1) households demand for water and 
the non-residential outputs are independent, and 2) the output markets for non-residential customers are perfectly 
competitive or face linear demand (Renzetti 1992b; Brown and Sibley 1986).   
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Finally, we track changes in the deadweight loss to society as a result of the transition 
from the status quo tariff to different tariff alternatives. We calculate the change in deadweight 
loss as the difference between the change in the magnitude of subsidies associated with a shift to 
a new tariff and the change in change in customer welfare that accompanies this transition.  
3.4 Data and Tariff Alternatives 
 
We simulate the performance of alternative tariffs using the case of the Nairobi Water 
and Sewer Company. According to Kenya’s most recent census, approximately 25% of Nairobi’s 
population indicated that their primary drinking water source was a piped water connection into 
their dwelling (KNBS 2009). This is a private piped connection connected to indoor plumbing. 
An additional 50% indicated that their primary drinking water source was a piped connection 
that was not piped into their dwelling, suggesting that in 2009 half the population in Nairobi 
obtained water from a shared connection or public tap. Seventeen percent of households 
indicated that water vendors were their primary source for drinking water.   
We populate our simulation model with information on customer water use from a 
complete set of 21 months of NCWSC’s billing records. This includes households in Nairobi 
with a private piped connection to the network, households with a shared connection that are 
served by the utility, and households that obtain water from public kiosks. The billing data cover 
the period from August 2012 to May 2014 and contain information on the water use of 
NCWSC’s approximately 200,000 customer accounts. We calculate customers’ average monthly 
water use over this period from actual meter readings in the billing data (see Fuente et al. 2016 
for additional detail).  
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NCWSC does not have socioeconomic or demographic information about its customers. 
In the absence of household-level data on income or socioeconomic status, we use the 
geographic location of customer accounts as a proxy for socio-economic status. In particular, we 
use the GIS location of customer accounts to identify which accounts are located in low-income 
areas. We obtain information on the location and extent of low-income areas in Nairobi from the 
MajiData project of Kenya’s Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) and Water Services Trust 
Fund. (See Fuente et al. 2016 for more information about these data). Using this approach, we 
find that approximately 20% of the accounts in the billing records are residential customers 
located in low-income areas.  
We compare the performance of five tariffs relative to the tariff that was in place during 
the period represented by the billing data we use in our simulations (Table 3.1). This status quo 
tariff is an IBT with four usage blocks (IBT4): 0-10 m3/mo., 11-30 m3/mo., 31-60 m3/mo., and 
greater than 60 m3/mo. The tariff alternatives we simulate include: an IBT with 3 usage blocks 
and a lifeline block of 10 m3/mo. per account (IBT3), an IBT with 2 usage blocks and a lifeline 
block of 5 m3/mo. per account (IBT2-5), an IBT with 2 usage blocks and a lifeline block of 10 
m3/mo. per account (IBT2-10), a uniform price tariff (UP), and a uniform price tariff with a 
fixed charge or rebate (UP+R), in which we set the uniform volumetric price equal to the long-
run marginal cost of service delivery.33 The IBT3 tariff alternative represents the tariff NCWSC 
applied for in its most recent tariff review. The IBT2-5 and IBT2-10 tariff alternatives provide an 
opportunity to examine how reducing the number of blocks and the size of the lifeline block 
affects tariff performance. The UP tariff allows us to examine how a simple uniform price tariff 
                                                           
33 For the purposes of our analysis, we assume that the long run marginal cost is equal to the average O&M and 
capital costs for water and sewerage service in Nairobi. (See Saunders et al. (1977) for a detailed discussion of 
alternative conceptions of marginal cost pricing for water and sanitation services.) 
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performs relative to IBTs and the UP+R tariff alternative provides an opportunity to examine the 
performance of a tariff promoted by economists to simultaneously promote economic efficiency 
and cost recovery.  
We simulate the performance of these five tariff alternatives under three cost recovery 
scenarios: status quo cost recovery (31%), an intermediate level of cost recovery (65%), and full 
cost recovery (100%). These cost recovery scenarios reflect cost recovery under our base case 
assumption that NCWSC has 30% non-revenue water and 85% collection efficiency, which 
reflects NCWSC’s current level of operational efficiency.  
In our base case scenario, the tariff alternatives share several common features. For 
example, we assume that the monthly meter rent is constant across all tariff scenarios (0.68 
USD/mo. at baseline) and that the volumetric price applied to bulk and kiosk customers is the 
same across tariff alternatives for a given level of cost recovery. With the exception of the UP+R 
tariff scenario, we assume that the sewerage surcharge is 75% for all tariffs, the same surcharge 
currently assessed by NCWSC. Under the UP+R tariff scenario, we set the volumetric rate for 
sewer service equal to the long-run marginal cost of sewer service. 
For the status quo level of cost recovery, we set the volumetric prices in each tariff to 
ensure the tariff alternatives reach the same level of cost recovery as the baseline tariff (31%). 
The prices for each tariff in this scenario remain constant throughout the 5-year planning 
horizon. For the IBT tariff alternatives there are an infinite combination of volumetric prices in 
each block that could achieve a particular level of cost recovery. We use the following tariff 
design guidelines to set the tariffs for our base case analysis.  In each cost recovery scenario, we 
assume that the price in the lifeline block of the IBT tariff alternatives is the same. For example, 
in the status quo cost recovery scenario (31%), we assume that the volumetric price in the lifeline 
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block is 0.22 USD/m3 in all IBT tariff alternatives. In the IBT3 tariff scenario, we set the prices 
in the second and third usage blocks so that the volumetric prices in each usage block are 
proportional to the prices in NCWSC’s most recent application for a new tariff. In the IBT2-5 
and IBT2-10 tariff scenarios, we set the price in the upper usage block to meet the target level of 
cost recovery. For the UP tariff, we set the uniform volumetric price to achieve the target level of 
cost recovery given our assumptions about the magnitude of the meter rent and sewerage 
surcharge.  
Finally, under the UP+R tariff, we set the volumetric price for water and sewerage 
service equal to the long run marginal cost of service delivery and apply a positive fixed charge 
or a rebate to meet the appropriate cost recovery level in each year.34 For example, if revenue 
exceeds the amount necessary to meet a particular level of cost recovery, customers receive a 
rebate. Conversely, when revenue is not sufficient to meet a particular level of cost recovery, 
customers are assessed a positive fixed charge. We assume the fixed charge or rebate is applied 
in a lump sum manner – i.e., the fixed charge or rebate allocated to each customer is calculated 
by dividing the amount needed to achieve the target level of cost recovery by the total number of 
customer accounts. We also assume that the fixed charge or rebate does not affect customers’ 
decisions to connect to, or disconnect from, the piped water and sewer network.  
For the intermediate level of cost recovery and full cost recovery scenarios, we follow the 
same tariff setting guidelines described above, but increase the volumetric prices in each tariff 
alternative by a fixed percent (in real terms) every year to reach the target level of cost recovery 
                                                           
34 We set the rebate or fixed charge each year to ensure that the UP+R tariff alternative provides the same annual 
level of cost recovery as the UP tariff alternative over the five-year planning period.  
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in the final year of the planning horizon.35  Many tariff design alternatives can achieve the same 
level of cost recovery. For example, in our intermediate and full cost recovery scenarios we 
assume that the meter rent is increased by the same percentage as the volumetric prices 
throughout the planning period. Alternatively, we could have opted to leave the meter rent at the 
current level and set the required annual price increase to meet the specified level of cost 
recovery accordingly. We could have also opted not to increase the volumetric price in the 
lifeline block over the simulation period and increased the prices in the upper blocks to meet the 
specified cost recovery objective. While these are potentially important considerations for tariff 
design for a particular utility, they do not affect the relative performance of the tariff alternatives 
we simulate, the primary objective of this paper. 
 
3.5 Results 
 
The NCWSC billing data used in our simulations contain approximately 200,000 
accounts. Residential customers constitute nearly 95% of customer accounts in NCWSC’s billing 
records and account for approximately 60% of water sold (Table 3.2). Although non-residential 
customers represent a small share (5%) of the total number of accounts, they account for 35% of 
total water use and 40% of total revenue under the baseline tariff. Mean water use among 
                                                           
35 There are several potential “paths” to achieve a target level of cost recovery by a specified date. For example, a 
utility could increase prices rapidly in the early years of a planning horizon and less dramatically in the later years. 
Alternatively, they could raise prices slowly in the initial years and increase them more dramatically in the latter 
years of planning horizon. Both approaches could meet a cost recovery target by the end of the specified planning 
period, but have different implications with respect to the temporal allocation of costs and benefits as well as the 
political economy of the tariff reform process. We abstract from this in our simulations and increase prices the same 
percent each year because it does not affect the relative performance of the tariff alternatives we consider.  
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residential customers is 31 m3/mo. compared to 347 m3/mo. among non-residential customers. 
The high standard deviation in water use between residential and non-residential customers 
suggests there is considerable heterogeneity in water use within each customer class.  
Over 70% of customer accounts receive both water and sewer service.  Under the baseline tariff, 
residential customers with only water service pay an average price of 0.57 USD/m3.  Residential 
customers with both water and wastewater service pay an average of 0.80 USD/m3 for both 
services, which reflects the 75% surcharge NCWSC assesses for wastewater service.  
Under the status quo tariff, NCWSC achieves a simulated 31% level of cost recovery in year 5 of 
the planning period and would sell approximately 12.6 million m3/mo. of water per month under 
our base case assumptions. Under the status quo tariff, residential customers in low-income areas 
receive 13% of the total subsidy delivered through the tariff, which is proportional to their share 
of water use, but less than the share of total accounts they represent (20%).  
 
3.5.1 Status quo cost recovery (31%) 
 
Table 3.3 summarizes the results of our simulation at status quo levels of cost recovery 
under our base case assumptions. The IBT3 and IBT2-10 tariffs result in similar levels of water 
use as the baseline tariff (IBT4). The IBT2-5 and UP tariffs produce a small (2%) decrease in 
total water use relative to the baseline tariff. In contrast to the similar levels of total water use 
simulated under the IBT and UP tariffs, the UP+R tariff yields a 19% reduction in water use 
relative to the baseline tariff. This simulated reduction in water use is driven by the fact that the 
volumetric price for water service under the UP+R tariff is four times larger than the volumetric 
price in the first block of the baseline tariff and one and half times larger than the price in the 
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highest block of the baseline tariff (Table 3.4). The magnitude of the simulated reduction in 
water use under the UP+R tariff must be viewed with caution because the elasticities used in the 
simulation model represent customers’ response to small (marginal) changes in price.  
All customers are subsidized at status quo levels of cost recovery. The magnitude of the 
subsidy delivered through the tariff is quite large, approximately 150% of the total revenue 
received by the utility.  The IBT and UP tariff alternatives result in small changes in the net 
present value of subsidies delivered through the tariff over the simulation period. This reflects 
the fact that all the tariff alternatives produce the same level of cost recovery by design and that 
water use is largely unchanged under each of these tariff alternatives relative to the baseline 
tariff. In contrast, the UP+R tariff alternative results in 17% reduction in the net present value of 
the subsidies delivered through the tariff, which accompanies the simulated reduction in water 
use. Under the UP+R tariff, customers receive subsidies as a rebate rather than through the 
volumetric prices in the tariff. At the status quo level of cost recovery, customers receive a rebate 
of 35 USD/mo. per account.  
The IBT and UP tariff alternatives perform similar to the baseline tariff with respect to 
subsidy incidence, delivering 12-13% of the total subsidies to residential customers in low-
income areas. This reflects the low correlation between income and water use in Nairobi (Fuente 
et al. 2016) as well as the fact that we do not impose different behavioral assumptions on low-
income customers and other residential customers. Only the UP+R shows a marked improvement 
in subsidy incidence relative to the baseline tariff, delivering 20% of the subsidies to customers 
in low-income areas. This improvement in subsidy targeting occurs because all accounts receive 
the same rebate under the UP+R tariff. While the UP+R tariff performs better than the other 
tariff alternatives with respect to subsidy incidence, subsidies remain poorly targeted because 
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nearly 80% of the subsidies do not reach the intended beneficiaries. This finding is consistent 
with other research that shows that the water tariff is an ineffective means of delivering subsidies 
to low-income customers (Komives et al. 2005; Whittington et al. 2015; Fuente et al. 2016; 
Nauges and Whittington 2017).  
Prices are far below the long-run marginal cost of service delivery at the status quo level 
of cost recovery. At such low prices, customers enjoy considerable welfare gains relative to 
efficient pricing. Under the baseline tariff, we estimate the consumer surplus for residential 
customers relative to efficient prices is approximately 4.7 million USD/mo. in year 5 of the 
simulation.36 Overall, each tariff alternative produces a small increase in the net present value in 
customer welfare at status quo levels of cost recovery relative to the baseline tariff. The UP tariff 
alternative results in a slightly larger increase in customer welfare than the IBT tariff 
alternatives, which reflects the decrease in the average price facing high volume customers under 
this tariff.  
Customers experience the largest simulated gains (6%) under the UP+R tariff. Though 
customers experience a reduction in welfare associated with reduced water use, they receive a 
rebate from the utility under the UP+R tariff. At status quo levels of cost recovery, the net 
                                                           
36 The average surplus received by residential customers is 20 USD/mo. account. This may appear large, 
particularly in the context of Nairobi. However, there are several factors that must be considered when interpreting 
the magnitude of these surplus gains. First, we measure consumer surplus from a hypothetical baseline of long-run 
marginal cost pricing in which the volumetric price is much higher than the price facing customers at status quo 
levels of cost recovery. The elasticities used in our welfare calculations describe customer response to small price 
changes and may not accurately describe consumer response to large price changes. Second, the magnitude of the 
consumer surplus enjoyed by customers relative to efficient prices at status quo cost recovery are much lower than 
the subsidy delivered through the tariff (~75 USD/mo. per account). Finally, 20 USD/mo. per account may appear 
large compared to perceptions of household incomes in Nairobi. However, we estimate the surplus for a household 
with a private connection consuming 15 m3/mo. facing the status quo tariff to be approximately 5.76 USD/mo. This 
is larger than their bill (5.16 USD/mo.), but smaller than the subsidy associated their water use (~9 USD/mo.). It is 
also important to recall that only the relatively well-off have private piped connections to the network in Nairobi. 
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present value of the rebate over the simulation period is larger than the net present value of the 
decreases in welfare associated with UP+R tariff. 
All of the tariff alternatives result in net losses to society at status quo levels of cost 
recovery because the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through the tariff is larger than the 
welfare gain customers experience from the low volumetric prices at this level of cost recovery. 
Table 3.3 shows the change in deadweight loss associated with the shift from the baseline tariff 
to each of the tariff alternatives at status quo levels of cost recovery. Though all of the tariff 
alternatives produce some reduction in the deadweight loss to society, the IBT3 tariff results in 
the smallest reduction in the deadweight loss to society. The IBT2-5 and UP tariffs produce 
similar reductions in the deadweight loss to society, which reflects the fact that the magnitude of 
the subsidy remains unchanged while customers experience small increases in welfare under 
these tariffs. The UP+R tariff produces the largest reduction (35%) in the net present value of 
losses over the simulation period relative to efficient pricing, which reflects the simulated 
decrease in subsidies under the UP+R tariff and the fact that customers experience slightly larger 
increases in welfare compared to the other tariff alternatives.  
 
3.5.2 Intermediate cost recovery (65%) 
 
At status quo levels of cost recovery customers experience considerable welfare gains 
relative to efficient pricing. However, this results in a large deadweight loss to society, 
highlighting potentials gains that can be achieved by improving cost recovery. To achieve our 
intermediate level of cost recovery (65%) by the end of the five-year simulation period, prices 
must be increased 16% (in real terms) annually (Table 3.4). This results in prices in the IBT and 
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UP tariffs more than doubling over the five-year simulation period. For example, the price in the 
lifeline block of the IBT tariffs increases from 0.22 USD/m3 to 0.47 USD/m3 in year 5. 
Similarly, the volumetric price in the UP tariff increases from 0.47 USD/m3 to 0.99 USD/m3, 
slightly more than our estimates of the long-run marginal cost of water supply in Nairobi. 
Though the volumetric price in the UP+R tariff does not change, the rebate customers receive 
under this tariff decreases from 35 USD/mo. per to 4 USD/mo. per account.  
At 65% cost recovery, the performance of the tariff alternatives relative to one another is 
similar to what we observe at status quo levels of cost recovery (Table 3.5). For example, as 
prices increase to improve cost recovery, the IBT and UP tariff alternatives produce similar 
decreases in the overall water use (8-10%) relative to the baseline tariff. The UP+R tariff 
produces the same simulated reduction (19%) in water use as the status quo level of cost 
recovery because the volumetric price does not change under the UP+R tariff. 
The increase in prices necessary to meet the intermediate level cost recovery, and the 
simulated decrease in water use that accompany this increase, result in a reduction in customer 
welfare relative to the baseline tariff. The net present value of the change in customer welfare 
over the simulation period ranges from approximately -11 million USD/mo. (UP+R) to -13.5 
million USD/mo. (IBT3). This corresponds to a 39% (UP+R) to 48% (IBT3) decrease in the 
welfare gains customers experience under the baseline tariff relative to efficient prices. As we 
observe at status quo levels of cost recovery, in aggregate customers experience smaller 
reductions in welfare under the UP tariff than the IBT tariff alternatives.  
Relative to the low prices they face at status quo levels of cost recovery, customers are 
worse off when the utility increases prices to reach the intermediate level of cost recovery. 
However, this increase in prices results in a decrease in the magnitude of the subsidies delivered 
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through the tariff and all of the tariff alternatives result in simulated reductions in the deadweight 
loss to society. The reduction in simulated losses ranges from -4.5 million USD/mo. under IBT3 
to -12.6 million USD/mo. under UP+R. The UP and IBT2-5 tariffs result in a slightly larger 
reduction in the deadweight loss to society than the IBT2-10 and IBT3 tariff alternatives.  This 
reflects the fact that the IBT and UP tariff alternatives produce the same reduction in subsidies 
delivered through the tariff while the UP and IBT2-5 tariffs result in smaller decreases in 
customer welfare. 
 
3.5.3 Full cost recovery 
 
Substantial subsidies are still delivered through the tariff at intermediate levels of cost 
recovery. To reach full cost recovery by the end of the simulation period, the utility would need 
to increase prices 27% annually (Table 3.4). Under these price increases, the price in the lifeline 
block of the IBT tariff alternatives increases from 0.22 USD/m3 to 0.72 USD/m3. Similarly, the 
volumetric price in the UP tariff increases from 0.47 USD/m3 to 1.51 USD/m3, well above our 
estimate of the long-run marginal cost of water supply in Nairobi. At the status quo and 
intermediate levels of cost recovery customers receive a rebate under the UP+R tariff. However, 
to reach full cost recovery, customers must be assessed a fixed charge of 26.50 USD/mo. per 
account.  
As shown in Table 3.6, we observe a similar pattern in the relative performance of the 
tariff alternatives as in the status quo and intermediate levels of cost recovery. In particular, the 
IBT and UP tariff alternatives perform similar to one another and the UP+R tariff appears to 
outperform the other tariff alternatives across all of the criteria we consider.  
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Although the tariff alternatives exhibit similar relative performance as in the status quo and 
intermediate levels of cost recovery, the full cost recovery scenario provides insight into the 
implications of the utility moving towards financial self-sufficiency. At full cost recovery, the 
IBT and UP tariff alternatives result in a 13 to 19% reduction in aggregate water use in year five 
of the simulation period relative to the status quo tariff. As we caution above in the context of the 
UP+R tariff, however, the price increases required to achieve full cost recovery are quite large 
and the magnitude of these simulated reductions in water use must be interpreted with caution.  
Customers continue to receive subsidies as the utility increases prices annually to reach 
full cost recovery in the final year of the simulation. However, all of the tariff alternatives result 
in a 50% or larger reduction in the net present value of the subsidies delivered through the tariff 
over the simulation period.  This decrease in the net present value of subsidies, and the price 
increases required to achieve full cost recovery, are accompanied by substantial reductions in 
customer welfare (Table 3.6) across all tariff alternatives.  
 
3.5.4 Trade-offs along the path to cost recovery 
 
Thus far we have focused primarily on the relative performance of the tariff alternatives 
at the three levels of cost recovery, yet there are tradeoffs along the path to recovery that warrant 
additional attention. Figure 3.1 highlights the dynamics of the trade-off between customer 
welfare, the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through the tariff, and deadweight loss as the 
utility transitions from status quo levels of cost recovery to full cost recovery under the UP 
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tariff.37 At the beginning of the simulation period the utility is at status quo levels of cost 
recovery. At such low prices, customers experience considerable welfare gains relative to 
efficient pricing, but a large amount of subsidies are delivered through the tariff. Because the 
magnitude of the subsidy delivered through the tariff is larger than the gains in customer welfare, 
the status quo level of cost recovery results in a deadweight loss to society.  
As the utility increases prices to improve cost recovery, the magnitude of the subsidy 
delivered through the tariff decreases and customers experience a decrease in welfare relative to 
status quo levels of cost recovery. This results in a decrease in the deadweight loss to society as 
the utility moves along the path to full cost recovery.  
At approximately 70% cost recovery customers face efficient prices (i.e., the long-run 
marginal cost) and thus do not experience welfare gains relative to efficient prices. However, the 
utility does not achieve full cost recovery when customers face efficient prices because it 
operates at 30% non-revenue water. When customers face efficient prices, the deadweight loss to 
society is equal to the magnitude of the subsidy delivered through the tariff.  
To reach full cost recovery, the utility must increase prices above efficient prices. While 
this reduces and eventually eliminates the subsidy delivered through the tariff, it results in 
customers experiencing a decrease in welfare relative to efficient prices. Thus, at full cost 
recovery there is still a deadweight loss to society, which equals the decrease in welfare 
customers experience relative to efficient prices. It is interesting to note that at approximately 
                                                           
37 The deadweight loss and customer welfare in Figure 1 start from baseline welfare and deadweight loss under the 
status quo tariff relative to efficient prices.   
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80% cost recovery, deadweight loss to society is compromised equally of the subsidy delivered 
through the tariff and the losses customers experience due to inefficient pricing. 
 
3.6 Model Extensions and Additional Considerations  
 
There are several ways to extend our analysis and issues that warrant further 
consideration. In this section, we examine the relative performance of the tariffs alternatives we 
consider when customers respond to marginal, rather than average, price and discuss several 
issues associated with the implementation of a UP+R tariff in practice. We also highlight the 
limitations of our analysis and identify areas for additional research.   
 
3.6.1 What happens when customers respond to marginal price? 
 
In our base case simulations, we assume that customers respond to average rather than 
marginal price. Thus, it is not necessarily surprising that the IBT and UP tariff alternatives 
perform similarly to one another when customers respond to average price. We think it is 
reasonable to assume that customers in Nairobi respond to average price because water prices are 
currently very low in Nairobi and customers face a complicated IBT. However, it is plausible 
that customers might respond to marginal price under a less complicated tariff (e.g., an IBT with 
less blocks or a uniform price tariff) or as prices increase and become more salient. Thus, in this 
section we present the results of our simulations assuming that customers respond to marginal 
price.  
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Our simulations indicate that the prices required to reach the three levels of cost recovery 
are similar irrespective of whether customers respond to average or marginal price (Appendix 3-
3). For example, prices must be increased 16% and 27% annually to reach intermediate and full 
cost recovery, respectively, when customers respond to marginal price. This is the same as the 
price increases required to reach these levels of cost recovery when customers respond to 
average price.  
In general, all of the tariff alternatives result in smaller simulated reductions in water use 
than when customers respond to average price (Table 3.7). For example, the UP+R tariff 
produces a 13% simulated reduction in water use, compared to 19% when customers respond to 
average price. These smaller reductions in water use are accompanied by smaller decreases in 
customer welfare as the utility increases prices to improve cost recovery, particularly for the IBT 
tariffs. Finally, with the exception of the UP+R tariff, all tariff alternatives produce larger 
reductions in the deadweight loss to society when customer respond to marginal price.  
Whether customers respond to average or marginal price affects the magnitude of 
outcomes we simulate. This has implications for infrastructure planning as well as the magnitude 
of the welfare effects associated in the transition to new tariff structures and improved levels of 
cost recovery. However, the extent to which customers respond to average or marginal price also 
has implications for the performance of the tariff alternatives relative to one another.  
When customers respond to average price, our simulations indicate that the UP tariff 
alternatives (UP and UP+R) perform equally well or better than the IBT tariff alternatives across 
all of the criteria we consider. When customers respond to marginal price, however, the UP 
performs similarly to the IBT tariffs, but no longer dominates the IBT tariff alternatives (Table 
3.7). For example, at intermediate and full cost recovery, the UP tariff produces similar 
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reductions in total water use as the IBT tariff alternatives and the magnitude of the subsidy 
delivered through the tariff. However, the UP tariff produces slightly larger reductions in 
customer welfare than both the IBT2-5 and IBT2-10 tariffs. As a result, the UP tariff also leads 
to smaller reductions in the deadweight loss to society than the IBT2 tariff alternatives.  
Finally, we observe a narrowing of the performance gap between the UP+R tariffs and 
other tariff alternatives when customers respond to marginal price. For example, in our base case 
simulations there is a five to six percentage point difference in the reduction in water use 
between the UP+R and other tariff alternatives at full cost recovery. When customers respond to 
marginal price, this gap narrows to one to two percentage points. Unlike in our base case 
simulations, we also find that the UP+R tariff produces similar reductions in welfare as the IBT2 
tariff alternatives as prices increase to reach full cost recovery. 
3.6.2 Reconsidering the Uniform Price with Rebate (UP+R) tariff 
 
Economists have long recommended the UP+R tariff on the grounds of promoting 
economic efficiency (Coase 1946; Saunders et al. 1977). Our simulations show that the UP+R 
outperforms the IBT and UP tariff alternatives with respect to not only economic efficiency, but 
also equity (i.e., subsidy incidence), the welfare effects on customers, and conservation at all 
levels of cost recovery. This finding holds regardless of whether customers respond to average or 
marginal price. These results could be interpreted as providing a convincing case that the UP+R 
tariff should be implemented more widely in the sector. However, we caution against that 
interpretation for several reasons discussed below.  
First, utilities may find the UP+R tariff administratively or politically difficult to 
implement. In weak institutional contexts, or where the public has a low level of confidence in 
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public institutions, it may not be politically feasible or advisable for utilities to collect revenues 
that would later be returned to customers in the form of a rebate. The implementation of the 
UP+R tariff also requires a credible and politically acceptable means of calculating the 
magnitude of the fixed charge (or rebate) required to meet the utility’s target level of cost 
recovery. This raises practical questions about how a utility might implement a UP+R tariff.  
For example, should the fixed charge or rebate be determined ex ante based on forecasts 
of customer water use and input costs or ex post once customer water and input costs have been 
observed? If the utility (or regulator) determines the fixed charge ex ante, they risk under or 
overestimating the magnitude of the fixed charge (or rebate) to reach a particular level of cost 
recovery. However, the utility may have limited incentive to contain costs if the fixed charge (or 
rebate) is determined ex post.  
Additionally, our simulations indicate that the magnitude of the fixed charge or rebate 
under UP+R pricing can be quite large. This can occur when the utility operates at low levels of 
cost recovery, exhibits a high level of non-revenue water, or when the marginal cost is 
substantially different than average cost. The efficiency promoting properties of the UP+R tariff 
require the rebate or fixed charge to be applied in a lump sum manner. This means that the utility 
would need to administer the rebate in a manner that did not affect customers’ decisions about 
how much water to use or their decision about whether to connect or disconnect from the 
network. This raises important questions about both how and when the fixed charge is assessed 
or the rebate is delivered.  
It is possible that the rebate or fixed charge would be less likely to influence customers’ 
monthly water use if it is applied on an annual basis. However, this may not be politically 
acceptable or desirable for the reasons discussed above. Additionally, if the fixed charge or 
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rebate were applied on an annual basis, should it be applied at the beginning, middle, or end the 
fiscal year? The decision about when to apply the fixed charge or rebate may have implications 
for how customers respond to it.   
There may also be behavioral implications related to how the fixed charge or rebate is 
implemented. For example, a rebate could be applied as credit on customers’ utility bills, as a 
one-time cash transfer (e.g., an annual payment), or as a credit against income or property tax 
(e.g., if the utility was run by a municipality). It seems plausible that customers would respond 
differently to each of these modes of rebate delivery and that there may be considerable 
heterogeneity in customer responses associated with the timing and mode of delivery of the fixed 
charge or rebate.   
The magnitude of the fixed charge or rebate under the UP+R tariff may impact 
customers’ decisions about whether to connect or disconnect from the network. This may be not 
be a serious concern in industrialized countries where incomes are relatively high and self-supply 
options are often limited. However, entry-exist issues may be important in low- and middle-
income countries where groundwater use is often poorly (or not) regulated, the market for 
vendors (e.g., tanker trucks) is more well-developed, and many households have already invested 
in above and below ground storage. The extent to which the magnitude of a fixed charge or 
rebate might affect customers’ entry-exit decisions is an empirical question that must be 
considered to fully characterize the economic and financial implications of implementing a 
UP+R tariff.  
Finally, in a low or middle-income country context the magnitude of the fixed charge or 
rebate may be economically salient for some customers. If a rebate or fixed charge is a non-
negligible fraction of a customers’ income, it may affect their water use via an income effect. We 
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do not have information on customers’ income and therefore do not address this in our 
simulations. However, the extent to which a fixed charge or rebate influences customer water use 
may have implications for the performance of the UP+R tariff relative to other tariff alternatives.  
 
3.6.3 Limitations and opportunities for additional research 
 
While our results have several implications for the pricing of water and sanitation 
services in low- and middle-income countries, there are caveats that warrant mention as well as 
areas for future work. First, our simulations used water use data from a particular location in a 
particular point in time. While we believe conditions in Nairobi reflect conditions in many large, 
fast growing cities in low and middle-income countries, tariff design requires careful 
consideration of, and attention to, local conditions. Second, we simulated an illustrative set of 
tariffs to examine the relative performance of alternative tariffs structures. Given the central aim 
of this paper, we hold several factors constant across the tariff alternatives, including the 
magnitude of the meter rent, the price in the lifeline block for block tariffs, the sewerage 
surcharge, and pricing for kiosks and bulk customers. There is clearly scope for additional work 
to examine how each of these factors affects tariff performance.  
Third, we constructed a set of tariffs to compare the performance of alternative tariff 
structures. These tariff alternatives were not designed to optimize a particular objective or set of 
objectives. Tariff design using multi-objective optimization techniques represents another clear 
area of expansion for this work. Fourth, customers face large price increases under both the 
UP+R tariff and our full cost recovery scenario. The elasticities we use in our simulation 
represent customers’ response to small changes in price and there is considerable uncertainty 
about how customers would respond to such large price increases. While this would not affect 
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the relative performance of the tariffs we simulate, how customers respond to large price 
increases may have important implications for infrastructure planning and is an area for future 
research.  
Fifth, our simulations assume that non-residential customers are insensitive to price 
changes. This assumption may be valid at low prices, but may not hold if prices are increased 
dramatically. Additional information on the extent to which price changes affect non-residential 
customers’ water use, production, and profits would be necessary to more accurately estimate the 
impact of price changes on non-residential customers. The literature on the demand for 
municipal water and sanitation services among non-residential customers is quite thin 
(Worthington 2010) and represents a clear area for future research. Finally, we examined the 
performance of alternative tariff structures relative to a modest set of performance criteria. There 
are several objectives policy makers must balance when setting water and sanitation tariffs and 
careful attention must be paid to the political economy of tariff reform, including local 
perceptions of fairness and equity, the capacity of utilities to implement complex tariffs, and the 
incentives tariffs create for both utilities and customers.  
 
3.7 Summary and Conclusions 
 
Our simulations provide several insights with respect to the performance of the 
alternative tariff structures in Nairobi and for the design and evaluation of water and sanitation 
tariffs in low- and middle-income countries more broadly. Our findings suggest that the IBT 
tariff alternatives perform similarly to one another with respect to the portfolio of criteria we 
consider. This echoes the findings of Nauges and Whittington’s (2017) and suggests that the time 
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and resources policy makers and tariff consultants invest in determining the appropriate size of 
the lifeline block, the number of blocks in an IBT, and the relative prices between blocks may be 
misdirected.  
Additionally, economists have long recommended the UP+R tariff on the grounds of 
promoting economic efficiency (Coase 1946; Saunders et al. 1977). Our simulations indicate that 
the UP+R outperforms the IBT and UP tariff alternatives with respect to not only economic 
efficiency, but also equity (i.e., subsidy incidence) and several other policy-relevant indicators of 
tariff performance. These findings are robust to assumptions about whether customers respond to 
average or marginal price. Some utilities may find the UP+R tariff administratively or politically 
difficult to implement and there are several issues associated with how a utility might implement 
this tariff and, in turn, how this might affect customers’ response to a UP+R tariff in practice. 
Nevertheless, our simulations raise interesting questions about how customers might respond to 
large price increases, the extent to which a large fixed charge (or rebate) impacts customers’ 
entry-exit decisions, and whether the timing and mechanism for administering the fixed charge 
(or rebate) affects customer behavior. While these questions must be answered to determine 
whether a UP+R tariff can outperform other tariffs in a given context, our simulations suggest a 
UP+R tariff may warrant further consideration. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, we also find that a simple tariff with a uniform 
volumetric price (i.e., the UP tariff) performs equally well, or better than, the IBT tariff 
alternatives across all of the criteria we consider. While a UP tariff does not have the efficiency 
promoting properties of a UP+R tariff, they are easier to explain to customers and send a clearer 
signal about the cost of delivering water and sanitation services than IBTs. Thus, our findings 
suggest that a tariff with a uniform volumetric price may perform as well as or better than the 
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IBTs many utilities are implementing in low- and middle-income countries. This finding stands 
in stark contrast to current perceptions of best practice in tariff design among utility managers, 
regulators, and the consultants who provide tariff-setting advice.  
Utilities in low- and middle-income countries often implement tariffs that are not 
sufficient to cover the cost of providing water and sanitation services. Our findings reinforce the 
benefits of getting utilities on the path to full cost recovery. Improving cost recovery can 
promote more efficient water use, improve the financial viability of utilities, and deliver net 
social benefits to society. At low levels of cost recovery, existing customers of the utility 
experience relatively large welfare gains relative to efficient pricing. However, this comes at the 
expense of the utility, taxpayers (who may also be customers), and higher levels of government 
with resulting net losses to society. Low levels of cost recovery also lead to well-documented 
deteriorating levels of service quality and hinder governments’ ability to extend services to 
households that lack access to the piped water and sanitation network.  
Overall, our findings add to a growing body of literature that questions the widespread 
use of IBTs in low- and middle-income countries. However, with the exception of the UP+R 
tariff, we find that there is surprisingly little difference in the performance of the tariff 
alternatives we simulate at a given level of cost recovery. This is particularly true when we 
consider uncertainty about customer behavior. Taken together, our findings suggest that when 
tariffs are not sufficient to cover the cost of water and sanitation service delivery, utilities and 
governments have more to gain by improving cost recovery than focusing narrowly on the 
structure of the tariff used to charge customers for water and sanitation services.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 3.1. Summary of the tariff alternatives. 
 
Tariff 
Alternative Tariff Type 
No. 
Blocks 
Lifeline Block 
(m3/ac./mo.) 
IBT4 (baseline) IBT 4 10 
IBT3 IBT 3 6 
IBT2-5 IBT 2 5 
IBT2-10 IBT 2 10 
UP Uniform price n.a. n.a. 
UP+R 
Uniform price 
w/ rebate 
n.a. n.a. 
 
 
 
Table 3.2. Summary statistics from the NCWSC customer base.  
 
  Unit Residential 
Non-
residential Kiosk Bulk 
Water Use      
% total % 57% 35% 3% 4% 
Mean (s.d.) m3/mo. 31 347 192 11,301 
  (194) (1,927) (942) (47,609) 
Accounts % 94% 5% 1% <1% 
Total Revenue % 56% 41% 1% 2% 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Table 3.3. Summary of status quo cost recovery simulation results. 
 
    Status Quo Cost Recovery (31%) 
Criteria Units Status Quo IBT3 IBT2-10  IBT2-5 UP UP+R 
Water Use (t=5) m3/mo. 12,586,418 12,546,144 12,463,506 12,361,515 12,372,133 10,184,194 
% change %  n.a.  0% -1% -2% -2% -19% 
Subsidy (NPVa) USD/mo. -64,176,442 -64,259,346 -63,928,548 -63,002,367 -63,286,002 -53,372,468 
% change %  n.a.  0% 0% -2% -1% -17% 
Subsidy Incidence (t=5) % 13% 13% 13% 12% 12% 20% 
Change in Customer Welfare (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  660,356 937,804 789,208 1,047,355 1,829,944 
% status quob %  n.a.  2% 3% 3% 4% 6% 
Change in Deadweight Loss (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -577,452 -1,185,698 -1,963,283 -1,937,795 -12,633,918 
% status quob % n.a. -2% -3% -5% -5% -35% 
a All NPV calculations use a 10% discount rate.  
b Percent change measured relative to customer welfare and deadweight loss under the status quo tariff relative to efficient prices.  
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Table 3.4. Summary of tariff alternatives simulated under base case conditions (t=5). 
 
    Cost Recovery Scenario 
    31% 65% 100% 
Common Components   t=5 t=5 t=5 
Meter rent USD/mo. 0.68 1.44 2.22 
Sewer surcharge* % 75% 75% 75% 
Annual price increase % 0% 16% 27% 
4-Block IBT (IBT4 - status quo)         
0 to 10 USD/m3 0.22 0.22 0.22 
11 to 30 USD/m3 0.45 0.45 0.45 
31 to 60 USD/m3 0.50 0.50 0.50 
> 60  USD/m3 0.63 0.63 0.63 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Bulk USD/m3 0.30 0.30 0.30 
3-block IBT (IBT3)         
Block 1 UB m3/mo. 6 6 6 
Block 2 UB m3/mo. 60 60 60 
P Block 1 USD/m3 0.22 0.47 0.72 
P Block 2 USD/m3 0.37 0.78 1.21 
P Block 3 USD/m3 0.59 1.26 1.94 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.36 0.56 
Bulk USD/m3 0.30 0.64 0.98 
2-Block IBT: 10 m3/mo. block 1 (IBT2-10)         
Size of LLB m3/mo. 10 10 10 
Price in LLB USD/m3 0.22 0.47 0.72 
Price in UB USD/m3 0.52 1.10 1.70 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.36 0.56 
Bulk USD/m3 0.30 0.64 0.98 
2-Block IBT: 5 m3/mo. block 1 (IBT2-5)         
Size of LLB m3/mo. 5 5 5 
Price in LLB USD/m3 0.22 0.47 0.72 
Price in UB USD/m3 0.51 1.07 1.65 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.36 0.56 
Bulk USD/m3 0.30 0.64 0.98 
Uniform Price (UP)         
Volumetric price USD/m3 0.47 0.99 1.51 
Uniform Price w/ Rebate (UP+R)         
Vol. price (water only) USD/m3 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Vol. price (water + wastewater) USD/m3 1.93 1.93 1.93 
Vol price (wastewater only) USD/m3 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Rebate (+)/Fixed Chard (-) USD/ac/mo. 35 4 -26.50 
* Except the UP+R tariff     
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Table 3.5. Summary of intermediate cost recovery simulation results. 
 
    Intermediate Cost Recovery (65%) 
Criteria Units Status Quo IBT3 IBT2-10  IBT2-5 UP UP+R 
Water Use (t=5) m3/mo. 12,586,418 11,551,921 11,474,577 11,378,184 11,384,305 10,184,194 
% change %  n.a.  -8% -9% -10% -10% -19% 
Subsidy (NPVa) USD/mo. -64,176,442 -46,121,476 -45,734,727 -45,147,390 -45,435,421 -40,451,553 
% change %  n.a.  -28% -29% -30% -29% -37% 
Subsidy Incidence (t=5) % 13% 14% 12% 12% 12% 20% 
Change in Customer Welfare (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -13,532,599 -13,200,968 -13,031,142 -12,733,580 -11,090,970 
% status quob %  n.a.  -48% -47% -46% -45% -39% 
Change in Deadweight Loss (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -4,522,366 -5,240,747 -5,997,910 -6,007,441 -12,633,918 
% status quob % n.a. -13% -15% -17% -17% -35% 
a All NPV calculations use a 10% discount rate.  
b Percent change measured relative to customer welfare and deadweight loss under the status quo tariff relative to efficient prices.
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Table 3.6. Summary of full cost recovery simulation results. 
 
    Full Cost Recovery (100%) 
Criteria Units Status Quo IBT3 IBT2-10  IBT2-5 UP UP+R 
Water Use (t=5) m3/mo. 12,586,418 10,954,546 10,885,809 10,789,277 10,799,428 10,184,194 
% change %  n.a.  -13% -14% -14% -14% -19% 
Subsidy (NPVa) USD/mo. -64,176,442 -31,845,107 -31,437,491 -30,962,315 -31,442,092 -28,531,027 
% change %  n.a.  -50% -51% -52% -51% -56% 
Subsidy Incidence (t=5) % 13% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Change in Customer Welfare (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -25,521,990 -25,141,093 -24,857,603 -24,371,607 -23,011,497 
% status quob %  n.a.  -90% -89% -88% -86% -81% 
Change in Deadweight Loss (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -6,809,345 -7,597,858 -8,356,524 -8,362,742 -12,633,918 
% status quob % n.a. -19% -21% -23% -23% -35% 
a All NPV calculations use a 10% discount rate.  
b Percent change measured relative to customer welfare and deadweight loss under the status quo tariff relative to efficient prices. 
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Table 3.7. Summary of simulation results when customers respond to marginal price. 
 
    Status Quo Cost Recovery (31%) 
Criteria Units Status Quo IBT3 IBT2-10  IBT2-5 UP UP+R 
Water Use (t=5) m3/mo. 12,571,600 12,698,432 12,679,173 12,619,545 12,752,211 10,884,020 
% change %  n.a.  1% 1% 0% 1% -13% 
Subsidy (NPVa) USD/mo. -64,079,718 -64,978,987 -64,897,409 -64,446,098 -65,506,362 -56,694,684 
% change %  n.a.  1% 1% 1% 2% -12% 
Subsidy Incidence (t=5) % 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 20% 
Change in Customer Welfare (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  1,697,188 2,506,501 2,023,042 1,724,366 3,504,766 
% status quob %  n.a.  6% 9% 7% 6% 12% 
Change in Deadweight Loss (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -797,919 -1,688,810 -1,656,663 -297,722 -10,889,800 
% status quob % n.a. -2% -5% -5% -1% -31% 
        
    Intermediate Cost Recovery (65%) 
Criteria Units Status Quo IBT3 IBT2-10  IBT2-5 UP UP+R 
Water Use (t=5) m3/mo. 12,571,600 11,718,436 11,702,025 11,653,294 11,775,603 10,884,020 
% change %  n.a.  -7% -7% -7% -6% -13% 
Subsidy (NPVa) USD/mo. -64,079,718 -46,550,568 -46,387,038 -46,374,551 -46,995,136 -43,070,624 
% change %  n.a.  -27% -28% -28% -27% -33% 
Subsidy Incidence (t=5) % 13% 14% 12% 12% 12% 20% 
Change in Customer Welfare (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -11,959,821 -10,621,233 -10,901,058 -11,987,101 -10,115,411 
% status quob %  n.a.  -42% -37% -38% -42% -36% 
Change in Deadweight Loss (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -5,569,328 -7,071,448 -6,804,109 -5,097,481 -10,893,684 
% status quob % n.a. -16% -20% -19% -14% -31% 
a All NPV calculations use a 10% discount rate.  
b Percent change measured relative to customer welfare and deadweight loss under the status quo tariff relative to efficient prices.
   
 
   
121
 
Table 3.7 (cont.’d). Summary of simulation results when customers respond to marginal price. 
 
    Full Cost Recovery (100%) 
Criteria Units Status Quo IBT3 IBT2-10  IBT2-5 UP UP+R 
Water Use (t=5) m3/mo. 12,571,600 11,144,977 11,111,075 11,072,336 11,197,165 10,884,020 
% change %  n.a.  -11% -12% -12% -11% -13% 
Subsidy (NPVa) USD/mo. -64,079,718 -31,997,088 -32,216,801 -31,874,950 -32,311,800 -29,953,075 
% change %  n.a.  -50% -50% -50% -50% -53% 
Subsidy Incidence (t=5) % 13% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Change in Customer Welfare (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -23,455,021 -21,304,146 -21,861,420 -23,585,104 -23,230,451 
% status quob %  n.a.  -83% -75% -77% -83% -82% 
Change in Deadweight Loss (NPVa) USD/mo.  n.a.  -8,627,609 -10,558,772 -10,343,348 -8,182,814 -10,896,193 
% status quob % n.a. -24% -30% -29% -23% -31% 
a All NPV calculations use a 10% discount rate.  
b Percent change measured relative to customer welfare and deadweight loss under the status quo tariff relative to efficient prices. 
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Figure 3.1. Dynamics of the subsidy, customer welfare, deadweight loss, and cost recovery for 
the UP tariff alternative. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Tariffs play an essential role in generating the revenue to pay for the day-to-day operation 
of utilities, repair and replace ageing infrastructure, and finance to expand the piped water and 
sanitation networks to meet increasing demand for these services. This dissertation examines the 
pricing of water and sanitation services in low- and middle-income countries using the case of 
Nairobi, Kenya – a fast growing, major metropolitan area with conditions similar to that of many 
cities in developing countries. In particular, this dissertation examines the performance of 
different tariff structures with respect to several criteria that policy makers consider when 
designing tariffs for water and sanitations services. The major findings of each chapter are 
summarized below.  
Chapter 1 examines the extent to which the increasing block tariff (IBT) implemented in 
Nairobi effectively targets subsidies to low-income households. To accomplish this, I combine 
data on household socio-economic status and metered water use with empirical estimates of the 
cost of water and sanitation service delivery in Nairobi. I find that the magnitude of the subsidy 
delivered through the tariff is larger than the Nairobi City Water and Sewer Company’s (NCWSC) 
annual revenue. This is much larger than previous studies, which consider only tariffs for water 
service, would suggest. I also find that stated expenditure on water, a commonly used means of 
estimating water use, is a poor proxy for metered use. This has implications for future efforts to 
assess the incidence of subsidies delivered through water and sanitation tariffs as well as other 
studies that use stated expenditure as a proxy for water use.  
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Consistent with previous studies in the literature, Chapter 1 also demonstrates that the 
IBT in Nairobi does not effectively target subsidies to low-income households. Indeed, I find that 
residential customers in low-income areas receive less than 10% of the subsidies delivered 
through the tariff. I also find that subsidies are poorly targeted even among households with a 
private connection to the piped water and sewer network. This is because all customers are 
subsidized at current prices and there is a low correlation between income and water use in 
Nairobi. These findings add to a growing body of literature that suggests that the IBTs 
implemented by many utilities do not effectively target subsidies to low-income households.  
Subsidy incidence is, of course, one of several criteria that policy makers consider when 
designing tariffs for water and sanitation services. Recognizing this, Chapter 2 provides a 
systemic review of the peer-reviewed literature on pricing water and sanitation services, 
identifying ways in which the literature might inform water and sanitation service pricing and 
promising areas for future research. I find that the peer-reviewed literature on pricing municipal 
water and sanitation services is diverse, fragmented, and focused primarily on industrialized 
countries. I also find that the majority of studies examine two or fewer dimensions of tariff 
performance, limiting the extent to which the literature characterizes the actual tradeoffs policy 
makers face when designing tariffs. These findings suggest that there is considerable scope for 
additional research to better characterize the performance of tariffs for water and sanitation 
services in a range of economic and institutional contexts.  
Informed by the findings in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 presents a framework for simulating the 
performance of water and sanitation tariffs with respect to several policy-relevant criteria. I then 
evaluate the performance of alternative tariffs relative to several indicators of tariff performance, 
including: the overall quantity of water sold (i.e., conservation), the magnitude of the total 
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subsidy delivered through the tariff, subsidy incidence, and overall changes in social welfare. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, I find that tariff alternatives with a uniform volumetric price 
perform equally well or better than IBT tariff alternatives at the three levels of cost recovery 
considered.  This includes both a two-part tariff long promoted by economists (i.e., uniform price 
with rebate) as well as a simple tariff with a uniform volumetric price. These findings are robust 
to assumptions about whether customers respond to average or marginal price and stands in stark 
contrast to current perceptions of best practice in tariff design among utility managers, 
regulators, and the consultants who provide tariff-setting advice.  
Despite this, with the exception of the UP+R tariff, I find there is little difference in the 
performance of the tariff alternatives considered at a given level of cost recovery. This is 
surprising given the time and resources utilities and regulators typically invest in tariff design. 
Taken together these findings suggest that when tariffs are not sufficient to cover the cost of 
water and sanitation service delivery, utilities and governments have more to gain by improving 
cost recovery than focusing narrowly on the structure of the tariff used to charge customers for 
water and sanitation services. 
IBTs are among the most widely used tariffs by water utilities, particularly in low- and 
middle-income countries. This is due to the widespread perception that the IBT can 
simultaneously target subsidies to low-income households, recover costs from customers who use 
more water, and promote conservation. Overall, the findings presented in this dissertation call 
into question the rationale for implementing IBTs in low- and middle-income countries. Indeed, 
this dissertation reinforces the fact that water and sanitation tariffs are ineffective and inefficient 
means of delivering subsidies to low-income households. This suggests that if policy makers 
want to subsidize water and sanitation services for low-income households, they should explore 
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alternative subsidy delivery mechanisms, including both connection subsidies and means-tested 
subsidies (i.e., subsidies for which households must meet an income or wealth criteria).  
Utilities in low- and middle-income countries often implement tariffs that are not 
sufficient to cover the cost of providing water and sanitation services. As documented in the case 
of Nairobi, this can result in considerable subsidies being delivered through water and sanitation 
tariffs. Improving cost recovery can promote more efficient water use, improve the financial 
viability of utilities, and deliver net social benefits to society. While existing customers benefit 
from low prices for water and sanitation services in the short term, this comes at the expense of 
the utility, taxpayers (who may also be customers), and higher levels of government with 
resulting net losses to society. Low levels of cost recovery also lead to deteriorating levels of 
service quality and hinder governments’ ability to extend services to households that lack access 
to the piped water and sanitation network. This dissertation reinforces the benefits of getting 
utilities on the path to full cost recovery, which will be essential to meet the global aspiration of 
achieving universal access to high quality water and sanitation services.  
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APPENDIX 1-1: SUMMARY OF SUBSIDY INCIDENCE LITERATURE 
Table A1-1. Summary of Studies in the Subsidy Incidence Literature (Adapted from Whittington et al. 2015) 
Study Country Data Sourcea 
Data 
Year Sample Size 
Water Use 
Measurea Indicator(s)b 
Subsidy 
Targetingc 
Whittington et al. 
(2015) 
Hypothetical Hypothetical n.a. n.a. Hypothetical Subsidy share Poor 
Barde and Lehmann 
(2014) 
Lima, Peru Billing data, 
expenditure 
survey, tariff 
2010 2570 Stated 
expenditure 
Affordability; 
subsidy share;  
EOI; EOE; leakage 
rate 
Poor (non-
means tested); 
Excellent 
(means tested) 
Angel-Urdinola and 
Wodon (2012) 
Nicaragua HH survey data 
and tariffs 
2001 & 
2005 
3641 (2001) 
6102 (2005) 
Stated 
expenditure 
Concentration 
coefficient 
Poor 
Banerjee and Morella 
(2011) 
Multi-
country - 
Africa 
HH surveys 
and tariffs 
Varies Varies Stated 
expenditure 
Affordability 
(share of HH total 
expenditure); 
concentration 
coefficient;  
Poor 
Banerjee et al 2010 45 utilities in 
23 African 
Countries 
LSMS and 
tariffs 
Varies Varies Stated 
expenditure 
Affordability 
(share of HH total 
expenditure); 
concentration 
coefficient;  
Poor 
Garcia-Valinas et al 
(2010)  
Spain  Municipal 
surveys 
2005 301 
municpalities 
Aggregate Affordability n.a. 
Diakite et al (2008) Cote d'Ivore HH panel data 1998-
2002 
780 total in 
panel 
(aggregate 
data) 
Aggregate Welfare gain/loss n.a. 
a Aggregate refers to data averaged over a geographic area (e.g., service region, metropolitan area, county, etc.). 
b EOE=Errors of exclusion. EOI=Errors of inclusion.  
c “Poor” = worse than if subsidies were equally or randomly distributed; “Moderate” = slightly better than if subsidies were equally or randomly 
distributed; “Excellent” = large proportion of subsidies targeted to low-income households. 
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Table A1-1 (cont.’d). Summary of Studies in the Subsidy Incidence Literature (Adapted from Whittington et al. 2015) 
Study Country Data Sourcea Data Year Sample Size 
Water Use 
Measurea Indicator(s)b 
Subsidy 
Targetingc 
Ruijs (2009) Sao Paolo, 
Brazil  
HH data 1997-2002 63 MRSP Aggregate Welfare gain/loss n.a. 
Ruijs et al (2008) Sao Paolo, 
Brazil  
Aggregate panel 
data for demand 
est.  
1997-2002 Panel of 39 
MRSPs 
(aggregate 
data) 
Aggregate Affordability n.a. 
Bardasi and Wodon 
(2008) 
Niger HH survey 1998 533 Stated use Average price n.a. 
Groom et al (2008) Beijing China HH income and 
expenditure survey 
- Panel 1987 2002 
1987-2002 645 HH plus 
aggregate 
data on 
quintiles 
Stated 
expenditure 
Welfare gain/loss Poor 
Fankhauser and 
Tepic (2007) 
Transition 
countries 
LSMS Varies Varies Stated 
expenditure 
Affordability (% 
of HH 
expenditure) 
n.a. 
Angel-Urdinola and 
Wodon (2007) 
Cape Verde, 
Sao Tome, 
Rwanda 
Nationally rep HH 
surveys 
Varies 1999-
2002 
Varies Stated 
expenditure 
Concentration 
coefficient 
Poor 
Foster and Yepes 
(2006) 
Multi-country 
Latin America 
LSMS Not stated Not stated Stated 
expenditure 
Affordability (% 
of HH that would 
spend more than 
x% if tariffs were 
raised) 
Poor 
a Aggregate refers to data averaged over a geographic area (e.g., service region, metropolitan area, county, etc.). 
b EOE=Errors of exclusion. EOI=Errors of inclusion.  
c “Poor” = worse than if subsidies were equally or randomly distributed; “Moderate” = slightly better than if subsidies were equally or randomly 
distributed; “Excellent” = large proportion of subsidies targeted to low-income households. 
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Table A1-1 (cont’d). Summary of Studies in the Subsidy Incidence Literature (Adapted from Whittington et al. 2015)  
Study Country Data Sourcea 
Data 
Year Sample Size 
Water Use 
Measurea Indicator(s)b 
Subsidy 
Targetingc 
Komives et al 
(2006) 
Multi-country Secondary 
literature 
Varies Varies Stated 
expenditure 
EOE; concentration 
coefficient 
Poor 
Komives et al 
(2005) 
Multi-country LSMS  varies Varies Stated 
expenditure 
Concentration 
coefficient; EOI, 
EOE; "Material 
impact"  
Poor 
Foster and Araujo 
(2004) 
Guatemala LSMS style 
national survey 
(ENCOVI 2000) 
2000 7,276 Stated 
expenditure 
EOE; EOI Poor 
Foster (2004) Argentina Primary HH 
Survey (2500 HH) 
2002 2,500 Previous bill; 
Stated 
expenditure; 
Imputed using 
regression 
Cumulative dist; 
concentration 
coefficient; EOI, 
EOE 
Moderate 
Gomez-Lobo and 
Contreras (2003) 
Chile and 
Columbia 
National HH 
surveys (Chile - 
CASEN 1998; 
Columbia - 1997 
NQLS) 
1997/98 Chile 
48,107; 
Columbia 
4,094 
Stated 
expenditure 
Concentration 
curves; EOI; EOE 
n.a. 
Foster et al (2000) Panama LSMS 1997 n.a. Stated 
expenditure 
EOE, EOI n.a. 
Walker et al (2000) Central 
America 
Household survey Varies 
1995-
1998  
Varies Previous bill EOI; EOE; 
Average subsidy 
per HH per mo; 
subsidy share 
Poor-
moderate 
a Aggregate refers to data averaged over a geographic area (e.g., service region, metropolitan area, county, etc.). 
b EOE=Errors of exclusion. EOI=Errors of inclusion.  
c “Poor” = worse than if subsidies were equally or randomly distributed; “Moderate” = slightly better than if subsidies were equally or randomly 
distributed; “Excellent” = large proportion of subsidies targeted to low-income households. 
   
   130 
APPENDIX 1-2: DISCUSSION OF STATED EXPENDITURE AS A PROXY FOR 
METERED WATER USE 
 
There are several reasons why imputed water use may not be a good proxy for metered 
water use. Households may not be able to accurately recall how much they spend on water and 
sanitation services. Households incur a variety of expenses each month and throughout the year 
and survey evidence suggests that water constitutes a very small portion of monthly household 
expenditure (often less than 3%) for households with piped connections (Appendix C.4 in 
Komives et al. 2005). Thus, it is possible that households may have difficulty recalling 
expenditure on water and sanitation services because they do not represent a major portion of 
their total expenditures. Indeed, in a 2,500 household survey conducted in Argentina, Foster 
(2004) reports that only 30% of the households were able to recall the amount of their most 
recent bill.  
Even if households can perfectly recall their monthly expenditure on water and sanitation 
services, there are additional reasons why expenditure on these services might be a poor proxy 
for actual water use. For example, income and expenditure surveys often do not contain 
information on whether a household connection is metered. If households do have metered 
connections, the meters may not be working or the utility may not read them on a regular basis.  
Households may also have a shared connection. In these instances, households’ water bills will 
not reflect their metered water use.  
Additionally, household budget and expenditure surveys ask households how much they 
spent on water last month. They typically do not ask households specifically how much they 
spent on piped water services, nor do they ask households how much they spent on sanitation 
services. For example, the most recent Kenya Integrated Household Budget and Expenditure 
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survey asks households “What was the total cost of water for your household last month?” 
(KNBS 2006). Thus, household recall of expenditure on water in these surveys may include the 
amount they spent on water from vendors and sewer services.  
Water bills may also include fees that are unrelated to water consumption in the most 
recent billing period. This could include fees for other services (e.g., solid waste collection), pro-
rated connection charges, arrears, or penalties for non-payment.  Additionally, countries in Latin 
America and elsewhere are experimenting with including payment for environmental services in 
water bills to promote watershed protection (see Whittington and Pagiola 2012). 
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APPENDIX 1-3: COST ESTIMATES USED IN THE LITERATURE 
Table A1-3a. Summary of Cost Estimates Used in the Literature. 
Study Location 
Cost Estimates  
(USD/m3) Service Includes Source 
Foster and Araujo (2004) Guatemala 0.30 - 0.40  Water Indicates "full cost" Cites "international benchmarks" 
Komives et al. (2005) Multi-country  See Table A1-3b Water Varies Not stated 
Komives et al. (2006) Multi-country See Table A1-3b Water Varies Not stated 
Foster and Yepes (2006) Multi-country 0.30  Water O&M Kingdom et. al (2004) 
Foster and Yepes (2006) Multi-country 0.90  Water O&M plus capital costs Kingdom et. al (2004) 
Groom et al. (2008) China 0.85  Water “Full financial” cost 
recovery 
Not stated 
Walker et al. (2000) Multi-country 0.09 - 0.27  Water O&M Not stated 
Walker et al. (2000) Multi-country 0.17 - 0.47  Water Capital costs including 
"financing charges plus 
depreciation" 
Not stated 
Barde and Lehman (2014) Peru 0.64  Water Not stated Average tariff 
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Table A1-3b. Cost Estimates from GWI (2004). 
  Developing country Industrialized countries 
<0.20 USD/m3 Tariff insufficient to cover 
basic operations and 
maintenance costs 
Tariff insufficient to cover 
basic operations and 
maintenance costs 
0.20 - 0.40 
USD/m3 
Tariff sufficient to cover 
operation and some 
maintenance costs 
Tariff insufficient to cover 
basic operations and 
maintenance costs 
0.40 - 1.00 
USD/m3 
Tariff sufficient to cover 
operations and maintenance 
costs and most investment 
needs 
Tariff sufficient to cover basic 
operations and maintenance 
costs 
>1.00 USD/m3 Tariff sufficient to cover 
operations and maintenance 
costs and most investment 
needs in the face of extreme 
supply shortage 
Tariff sufficient to cover full 
cost of modern water systems 
in most high-income cities 
Source: GWI (2004) in Komives et al (2005) 
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APPENDIX 1-4: SURVEY DESCRIPTION AND SAMPLING STRATEGY 
 
This paper uses data collected through a survey of approximately 739 NCWSC customers 
conducted between November 2013 and January 2014. (The study received UNC IRB approval 
under Study No. 13-1932 as well as approval from Kenya’s National Council for Science and 
Technology (Ref No. NACOSTU/P/13/8073/406.)  
The survey was comprised of eight modules. The first module recorded basic logistical 
information about the survey, including informed consent, enumerator code, date, and start time. 
Importantly this module recorded each household’s account number, which the enumerators 
recorded from the NCWSC meter readers’ log books. The account number allows us to identify 
households in the NCWSC billing records.  
The second module contained screening questions to ensure the households met the criteria 
for participation in the study and collected information related to the household’s piped water 
connection. This module also contained questions related household recall about expenditure on 
water and sanitation services. The third module of the survey collected information about the 
households’ composition and demographics. The fourth module contained questions related to 
their socioeconomic status, including questions about household expenditure, income and asset 
ownership. The fifth module asked households about additional water sources they might use, 
including private boreholes, water vendors, and bottled water. The sixth module contained a 
number of questions about the extent to which and under what circumstances households treated 
their drinking water. The seventh module collected information related to household sanitation 
facilities. Finally, the eighth module contained wrap up information about the survey, including 
the enumerators’ perceptions of the quality of the survey and the GPS coordinates of the 
households’ location.  
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In general, wealthier households are more likely to have a connection to the piped water 
and sewer network than lower income households. Because the objective of the household survey 
was to investigate the relationship between income and water use among NCWSC customers, the 
primary challenge for the survey was to ensure the sample had adequate income heterogeneity.  
To address limitations of the NCWSC administrative data, our sampling strategy combined 
purposive and stratified random sampling. NSWCS service area consists of six regions. Each 
region consists of zones, which are further subdivided into itineraries. There are 26 zones in total 
and approximately 2000 itineraries. Each itinerary contains between 100 and 200 accounts. 
NCWSC marketing associates (meter readers) use these itineraries on their daily meter reading 
routes.  
The project team and a committee from NCWSC first assigned an income category to each 
of the 25 zones based on the subjective, local knowledge of the project team and NCWSC staff 
members. Due to the fact that the primary sampling challenge was to ensure the sample had 
adequate income heterogeneity, the project team then identified the two regions with the highest 
representation of low income zones (Eastern and Northeastern) and randomly selected one of these 
regions (Northeastern). Similarly, we identified the two regions with the highest representation of 
high income zones (Southern and Western) and randomly selected one of these regions (Western).  
Once the two regions were selected, the following sampling strategy was employed. Each 
day the project team, in collaboration with head of billing and metering from the appropriate 
regional office randomly assigned enumerators to marketing associates, with two enumerators 
paired with a single marketing associate. Each pair of enumerators would then shadow a marketing 
associate on their meter reading route for that day. Starting at the beginning of the itinerary the 
marketing associate was reading that day, the enumerators were instructed to select the tenth 
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customer account as the first household. The marketing associate would then introduce one of the 
enumerators to the household and continue on their meter reading route. The second enumerator 
would select the twentieth account on the list and do the same.  
Once the enumerators completed an interview, they would call the marketing associate and 
meet them where he/she was in their current meter reading route. The enumerator would then use 
the next account as a sample household. If nobody was at the household, enumerators were 
instructed to note the address and attempt two call backs. If someone from the household was 
home, but did not have time to complete the survey or the head of household or their spouse was 
not home, enumerators were instructed to take the contact information of the head of household 
and attempt to schedule a call back two times before replacing the household in the sample.  
The survey included a number of quality control measures. First, each day the survey 
supervisor would collect and review completed questionnaires from the enumerators. If the 
supervisor identified problems with the questionnaire, enumerators were instructed to re-visit the 
households to verify or correct the information. Second, the project team conducted random spot 
checks on the enumerators to ensure they followed the prescribed sampling protocol and to ensure 
that they administered the survey instrument appropriately. This included spontaneously meeting 
enumerators in the field to observe interviews, conversations with the marketing associates about 
how the enumerators selected households, and visits or calls to households who had been surveyed 
to discuss the types of questions the enumerator asked them and how long they spent with them. 
We also employed double, independent data entry.  
As described in the main text, our final sample consists of 656 households. Of the initial 
741 households surveyed 83 households were dropped from the sample. One household was 
dropped due to a duplicate account number; 14 accounts could not be located in the NCWSC 
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billing data; 30 accounts only did not have an actual meter reading during the billing period we 
observed; and 38 accounts had no non-zero meter readings during the billing period we observed.  
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APPENDIX 1-5. WEALTH INDEX 
 
We constructed a wealth index using principle component analysis following Filmer and 
Pritchett (2001) and Filmer and Scott (2008). Table A1-5a presents the 28 variables we include 
in the wealth index. All variables were covnerted to indicator variables (0-1) or continuous 
variables as appropriate. The first column of Table A1-5a presents the first component (factor 
score) of the principle component analysis. The first component has an eignenvalue of 5.93 and 
explains 21.2% of variation in the 28 variables in our index.  For binary variables the factor score 
can be interpreted as the marginal change in a household’s wealth index score by going from not 
owning the asset to owning the asset. For example, cooking with biomass decreases a 
household’s wealth index score by 0.243. Similarly, having a security guard on premise increases 
a household’s wealth index score by 0.201.  
The distribution of the wealth index scores is relatively smooth and skewed to the right 
(Figure A1-5a). The verticle lines in Figure A1-5a indicate the cutpoints for the wealth index that 
divide our sample into five quintiles. Each quintile in our sample has 131 or 132 househholds.  
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Figure A1-5a. Distribution of factor scores used to construct the wealth index with quintile cut 
points. 
 
The second through sixth columns of Table A1-5a show the mean of each variable 
included in the index for households in each predicted wealth quintile. The final column in Table 
A1-5a presents the mean for each variable for the entire sample. The mean values for each 
variable across the wealth quintiles largely agree with our prior assumptions about the 
relationship between asset ownership and wealth. For example, one percent of households in the 
lowest wealth quintile report having an internet connection. In contrast, 71% of households in the 
highest wealth quintile report having an internet connextion. Similarly, less than 10% of 
households in the lowest wealth quintile report owning a car in contrast to 98% of households in 
the highest wealth quintile. Exceptions to this include the extent to which households own or rent 
their home and own land/property in or outside of Nairobi.  
 
 
 
0
.1
.2
.3
D
e
n
s
it
y
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4
Scores for component 1
   
 140 
 
Table A1-5a. Factor scores and mean values of components of the wealth index by predicted 
wealth quintile. 
  Factor Score Lowest Second Third  Fourth  Highest All   
Cooks with LPG 0.234 0.39 0.87 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.84 
Cooks with biomass -0.243 0.60 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.14 
Level of school completed 0.144 11.89 13.69 14.61 16.16 16.88 14.64 
Own/rent 0.039 0.52 0.34 0.48 0.49 0.74 0.51 
Separate kitchen in house 0.179 0.83 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 
Security guard 0.201 0.21 0.56 0.80 0.98 0.98 0.71 
Electric security fence 0.161 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.36 0.82 0.27 
Electricity connection 0.147 0.90 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 
Mobile phone 0.032 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Phone with data plan 0.126 0.57 0.76 0.82 0.89 0.94 0.79 
Internet connection 0.168 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.40 0.71 0.26 
TV 0.126 0.89 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.97 
Radio 0.104 0.70 0.82 0.89 0.84 0.83 0.81 
Computer/laptop 0.264 0.17 0.42 0.68 0.85 0.98 0.62 
Bicycle 0.214 0.12 0.24 0.20 0.37 0.50 0.29 
Motorcycle 0.224 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.04 
Car 0.277 0.08 0.31 0.56 0.85 0.98 0.56 
Washing machine 0.244 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.72 0.21 
Water heater 0.258 0.11 0.31 0.61 0.61 0.86 0.50 
Refrigerator 0.258 0.39 0.88 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.84 
Gas cooker 0.264 0.30 0.81 0.95 0.96 1.00 0.80 
Meko (local stove) 0.086 0.48 0.52 0.36 0.31 0.19 0.37 
Add.’l house in Nairobi 0.209 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.14 
Add.’l  house outside Nairobi 0.139 0.33 0.30 0.37 0.16 0.23 0.28 
Land in Nairobi 0.203 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.09 
Land outside Nairobi 0.091 0.48 0.51 0.56 0.34 0.18 0.42 
Borehole on property 0.070 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.17 0.05 
Toilet inside home 0.207 0.77 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 
Notes: n=656. Each quintile has 131 or 132 households.
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APPENDIX 3-1: SIMULATION MODEL PARAMETERS FOR THE BASE CASE SCENARIO 
 
 
Model Parameter Unit Model  
EXOGENOUS FACTORS     
Customer growth % 5% 
Economic growth % 5% 
Exchange rate KSH/USD 90 
Discount rate  % 10% 
CUSTOMER BEHAVIOR     
Average vs. marginal price n.a. Average price 
Residential IED n.a. 0.1 
Residential PED   
Usage threshold m3/mo. 5 
Upper PED n.a. -0.2 
Lower PED n.a. 0 
Non-residential PED n.a. 0 
OPERATIONAL 
EFFICIENCY     
NRW % 30% 
Collection efficiency % 85% 
COST     
Operations & 
Maintenance   
Water USD/m3 0.23 
Wastewater USD/m3 0.23 
Capital Costs   
Water USD/m3 0.71 
Wastewater USD/m3 0.75 
        PED = Price elasticity of demand 
         IED = Income elasticity of demand 
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APPENDIX 3-2: CALCULATION OF CONSUMER SURPLUS UNDER INCREASING 
BLOCK TARIFFS WHEN CUSTOMERS RESPOND TO MARGINAL PRICE 
 
As indicated in the main text, Equation 3.5 will not correctly measure the change in 
consumer surplus for increasing block tariffs when customers respond to marginal rather than 
average price. To address this, we measure the change in consumer surplus under each tariff 
alternative in a two-step process. In the first step, we calculate the change in consumer surplus 
under each tariff alternative relative to a hypothetical baseline in which customers face efficient 
prices, which we assume is the long-run marginal cost of service delivery. In the second step, we 
calculate the change in consumer surplus associated with moving from the baseline tariff to a 
new tariff as the difference in consumer surplus customers enjoy under the baseline tariff and 
new tariff relative to efficient prices. We describe this two-step process in more detail below.  
 
Step 1: Adjust estimates of consumer surplus to reflect surplus gained under increasing 
block tariffs.  
Figure A2-1 depicts a scenario in which a customer’s water use falls in the second block 
of a two block IBT with a 10 m3/mo. lifeline block (IBT2-10). When customers respond to 
marginal price, Equation 3.5 measures the area A+B as the change in consumer surplus relative 
to efficient pricing. However, the customer also receives area D under IBT2-10. To address this 
in our calculations of consumer surplus we add area D to the consumer surplus calculated in 
Equation 3.5. Figure A2-2 depicts a scenario in which a customer’s water use falls in the first 
block of IBT2-10. When customers respond to marginal price, Equation 3.5 measures the area 
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H+I as the gain in consumer surplus under IBT2-10 relative to efficient pricing. In this instance, 
Equation 3.5 measures the correct change in consumer surplus and no adjustment is required.  
 
 
Figure A2-1. Customer water use in block 2 of IBT2-10 relative to efficient pricing. 
 
 
Figure A2-2. Customer water use in block 1 of IBT2-10 relative to efficient pricing. 
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When customers respond to marginal price, we adjust the consumer surplus measured in 
Equation 3.5 to reflect the change in surplus associated with the usage blocks of the IBT tariff 
alternatives. The procedure we use to do this for the IBT2-10 tariff alternative is described in 
Equation A1 below.  
 
∆𝐶𝑆𝑚𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑇2−10 = {
∆𝐶𝑆𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑇2−10                                                           𝑖𝑓 max(𝑄𝑗,𝑡
∗ , 𝑄𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑇2−10) < 𝐵1
∆𝐶𝑆𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑇2−10 + (𝑃2,𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑇2−10 − 𝑃1,𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑇2−10) ∙ 𝐵1 𝑖𝑓 max(𝑄𝑗,𝑡
∗ , 𝑄𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑇2−10) > 𝐵1
 (A1) 
 
Where,  
• ∆𝐶𝑆𝑚𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑇2−10 is the change in consumer surplus for customer j in year t under IBT2-10 
when customer j responds to marginal price;  
• ∆𝐶𝑆𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑇2−10 is the change in consumer surplus for customer j in year t under IBT2-10 
when customer j responds to average price (Equation 3.5); 
• 𝑄𝑗,𝑡
∗  is customer j’s projected water use under efficient pricing in year t;  
• 𝑄𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑇2−10 is customer j’s water use under IBT2-10 in year t;  
• 𝐵1 is the size of the lifeline block under IBT2-10; and 
• 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑇2−10 is the volumetric price in block i under IBT2-10 in year t (i=1,2).  
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Step 2: Calculate the change in consumer surplus associated with the transition from the 
baseline tariff to a new tariff.  
In the second step, we calculate the change in consumer surplus that results from a shift from the 
status quo tariff, a 4-block IBT (IBT4), to a variety of different tariffs as described in Equation 
A2.  
∆𝐶𝑆𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑇4→𝑇 = ∆𝐶𝑆𝑡
𝑇 − ∆𝐶𝑆𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑇4 (A2) 
 
Where ∆𝐶𝑆𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑇4→𝑇 is the change consumer surplus associated with the shift from the status quo 
tariff to tariff alternative T in year t and ∆𝐶𝑆𝑡
𝑇 and ∆𝐶𝑆𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑇4 are the change in consumer surplus 
under tariff alternative T and IBT4, respectively, relative to efficient pricing in year t. 
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APPENDIX 3-3: SUMMARY OF TARIFFS AND PRICES WHEN CUSTOMERS 
RESPOND TO MARGINAL PRICE 
 
    Cost Recovery Scenario 
    31% 65% 100% 
Common Components         
Meter Rent USD/mo. 0.68 1.44 2.25 
Sewer surcharge* % 75% 75% 75% 
Annual price increase % 0% 16% 27% 
4-Block IBT (IBT4 - status quo)         
0 to 10 USD/m3 0.22 0.22 0.22 
11 to 30 USD/m3 0.45 0.45 0.45 
31 to 60 USD/m3 0.50 0.50 0.50 
> 60  USD/m3 0.63 0.63 0.63 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Bulk USD/m3 0.30 0.30 0.30 
3-block IBT (IBT3)         
Block 1 UB m3/mo. 6 6 6 
Block 2 UB m3/mo. 60 60 60 
P Block 1 USD/m3 0.22 0.47 0.72 
P Block 2 USD/m3 0.37 0.78 1.21 
P Block 3 USD/m3 0.59 1.26 1.94 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.36 0.56 
Bulk USD/m3 0.30 0.64 0.98 
2-Block IBT: 10 m3/mo. block 1 (IBT2-10)         
Size of LLB m3/mo. 10 10 10 
Price in LLB USD/m3 0.22 0.47 0.72 
Price in UB USD/m3 0.52 1.10 1.68 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.36 0.56 
Bulk USD/m3 0.30 0.64 0.98 
2-Block IBT: 5 m3/mo. block 1 (IBT2-5)         
Size of LLB m3/mo. 5 5 5 
Price in LLB USD/m3 0.22 0.47 0.72 
Price in UB USD/m3 0.51 1.06 1.64 
Kiosk USD/m3 0.17 0.36 0.56 
Bulk USD/m3 0.3 0.64 0.98 
Uniform Price (UP)         
Volumetric price USD/m3 0.46 0.98 1.51 
Uniform Price w/ Rebate (UP+R)         
Vol. price (water only) USD/m3 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Vol. price (water + wastewater) USD/m3 1.93 1.93 1.93 
Vol price (wastewater only) USD/m3 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Rebate USD/ac/mo. 37 5 -29 
* Except the UP+R tariff     
 
 
